Yale School of Management

How are Search Fund Investors Really Faring?

Daniel Lazier, Jacob Thomas, A. J. Wasserstein. (2025)

Yale Case, no number printed, October 27, 2025

Sample. "we used a valuable data set provided by 12 investors representing 23 funds" (p5), masked A to L, not named. "We solicited a wide range of serial search fund investors for data, and some chose to participate while others did not." (p6). "our data includes 1,192 observations in which an investor made an entrepreneur selection decision and a subset of 768 observations where an investor had to make a capital allocation decision." (p5). Observations are investor-deal pairs, not unique companies: "Some of our observations are duplicated, meaning investor B saw the same opportunity as investor J." (p5). "The broken searches represent $17 million in capital invested out of a total of $700 million deployed." (p9). Time window, vintages, geography and response rate: not stated. Included and excluded. Includes broken searches (the 1,192) and completed deals (the 768). Realized and unrealized are mixed: "If the deal is still operating, we use a current mark provided by the investor." (p6); the split is not stated. MOIC only (some investors did not share IRRs). Gross of fund fees. Traditional versus self-funded mix of the sample: not stated. Deals the investors passed on are unobserved. Headline numbers. "the 1,192 entrepreneur picks resulted in 768 actionable deals, yielding a 64% conversion rate." (p9). "Out of 1,192 entrepreneurs, 612 (51%) deals ultimately generated a positive return of at least 1.0x MOIC." (p9). "only 31% of the 768 completed deals generated a MOIC greater than 3.0x" (p9). "The mean MOIC including broken searches is 2.0x; the mean MOIC excluding broken searches is 2.78x. The median MOIC including broken searches is 1.0x, while the median MOIC excluding broken searches stands at 1.6x. Lastly, the weighted average MOIC for all investors across all funds is 2.50x." (p9). "The percentage of MOIC observations above 10.0x is just 2% (a one-in-fifty outcome)." (p7 to p8). Across the 12 investors' lifetime results: "The mean and median MOICs are 2.58x and 2.39x, respectively." and "Our maximum is 4.32x, which is lower than all the aggregate MOICs reported across different Stanford studies in Exhibit 1." (p11). "only five out of 23 funds have griffin exposure." (p15). Against Stanford (authors' own comparison, p18 to p20). "our sample data set consists of 1,192 observations, which is 14% of the potential Stanford observations." "The macro numbers are nearly identical, with similar acquisition rates of 63% and 64% and similar gain and loss rates at 69% and 68% and 31% and 32%, respectively." "we are seeing far fewer griffins (3%) than in the Stanford data set (11%)." "our reported MOIC (2.5x) is significantly lower than Stanford's (4.5x)." "We do not fully know why this is the case and cannot reconcile and disentangle the differences." Limits. Authors: "All our data comes from a dozen investors, which could introduce sampling bias."; "It is possible that investors with poorer results might have opted not to engage in the project."; "they are only directional at best and contain some inherent flaws." (p6). Reader's notes: the text calls the 768 a "768-company sample" (p15) although they are investor-deal observations with duplicates, and the number of unique companies is never given; the 95% interval on the mean treats duplicated observations as independent; griffin share is printed as 2% in one place and 3% in another; an unknown share of MOICs are unrealized investor marks; "at least 1.0x" counts exactly 1.0x as a positive return. The 4.5x is Stanford's number, not Yale's.

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A Mathematical Analysis of Value-Creation Attribution in Search Fund Projects

Daniel Lazier, Jacob Thomas, A. J. Wasserstein. (2026)

Yale Case, no number printed, January 12, 2026

Sample. "we contacted a broad range of serial ETA investors with a request for unmasked data. Ultimately, we received information from six investors about companies in their portfolios that have fully exited; there are no interim mark-to-market valuations, and all of the firms are classified as traditionally funded searches." (p2). "we created a comprehensive dataset of 59 unique observations" (p2), de-duplicated across investors; 48 remain after dropping exits above 19.9x EBITDA. "our dataset includes some observations from outside the U.S. and Canada" (p2). Time window: not stated; mean holding period 4.8 years (figure). Included and excluded. Fully exited, traditionally funded only. Excludes unrealized companies, self-funded deals, companies with negative EBITDA at exit, and leverage ("We exclude leverage from our analysis intentionally", p1). Organic and acquired EBITDA growth are not separated. Enterprise value only; equity returns are not analysed. Headline numbers. "EBITDA increases from roughly $158 million at entry to $254 million at exit, and the multiple rises from 6.3x to 15.6x." (p3). "approximately 20% ($605 million) to growth in EBITDA, and the remaining 80% ($2.4 billion) to multiple expansion." (p4). "Revenue increases from approximately $634 million at entry to $1.4 billion at exit, and the EBITDA margin contracts from 25% to 19%." (p5). "The total EV creation across our sample can be viewed as originating from three sources: 80% from EBITDA multiple expansion, 39% from revenue growth, and -18% from EBITDA margin contraction." (p6). "only 30% of the sample see EBITDA margin expansion, while 70% experience a reduction in EBITDA margins." (p8). "The EBITDA multiple decreases for only eight of the 59 firms" (p7). Coverage claim. "according to the 2024 Stanford Graduate School of Business Search Fund Study, 168 traditional search funds have exited. In other words, we are capturing 35% of the known ETA population that has exited." with the caveat "we are not making a direct apples-to-apples comparison." (p2). Limits. Authors name omitted variable bias, sample selection, survivor bias ("this group mainly consists of successful companies") and limited observations (p17 to p18), and note exits at 20x or more "probably relate to metrics other than EBITDA". Reader's notes: the 80/20 headline is a dollar-weighted aggregate that includes 11 exits at 20x or more; excluding them the split is 64% / 36% (figure, p3). The attribution is sequential (entry multiple applied to EBITDA change, exit EBITDA applied to multiple change) and a different ordering would move the split; the authors do not discuss this. One multiple regression on the 48-observation subsample (R squared 0.476, figure). Related Yale Insights summary is listed in section 2.

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A Detailed Analysis of ETA CEO Demographics and Financial Outcomes

Daniel Lazier, Jacob Thomas, A. J. Wasserstein. (2026)

Yale Case, no number printed, January 30, 2026

Sample. "we solicited a broad range of serial ETA investors for unmasked data. We ultimately received information from six investors on companies in their portfolios that have fully exited; there are no interim mark-to-market valuations, and all firms are categorized as traditionally funded searches." (p3). "we netted a robust dataset of 155 unique observations" (p3). Investors supplied company name, CEO name, IRR and MOIC; the authors added MBA school, work history, partnership status, gender and military background from LinkedIn and other databases. 139 U.S. and Canada, 16 elsewhere. Vintages and investor names: not stated. Included and excluded. "Additionally, our study does not include self-funded search funds." (p25). Excludes broken searches ("which typically account for about 35% of all initial search investments", p4) and companies still operating. Coverage: "168 traditional search funds have exited. In other words, we are capturing a material portion (92%) of the known ETA population that has sold." (p3), with the same not-apples-to-apples caveat because 16 are outside the U.S. and Canada. Headline numbers. Full sample (figure, p3): mean IRR 17.8%, median IRR 24.9%; mean MOIC 4.1x, median 3.0x; first quartile 2.6% and 1.2x, third quartile 46.1% and 5.1x; maximum 169.8% and 47.3x; n = 155. "MBAs have a higher median IRR (28% compared to 1%)" with MBA n = 141 and no MBA n = 14 (p6). "61 observations, or about 39% of the search funds we studied, involved partnered searches" (p4); partnered "median IRR of 32% for the segment, compared to 24% for solo initiatives." (p11). "the median and mean IRR for ETA projects outside the U.S. and Canada are 9% and negative 8%, compared with 28% and 21% for U.S. and Canadian funds." (p15). "we only had six observations of search funds led by at least one female" (p15). Multivariable regression: "Search funds in the U.S. or Canada have IRRs about 36 percentage points higher than those in other regions, after controlling for education, experience, and industry focus. This finding is statistically significant at the one-percent level" and no-MBA searchers "underperform their MBA-trained counterparts by approximately 25 percentage points in IRR" at the five percent level (p22). "The R-squared of 0.257 ... the adjusted R-squared is 0.114." (p21). School, partnership, prior profession, military service, gender and software focus are not significant in the joint model. Limits. Authors: "the mean and median IRRs and MOICs are unweighted arithmetic calculations, not dollar-weighted figures." and "these IRRs and MOICs are structurally inflated compared to a broad pack of operating and exited ETA firms, which also includes broken searches." (p4); "we present patterns and trends, but readers and we should refrain from ascribing causation." (p2); survivor bias and small cells acknowledged (p25). Reader's notes: final model reached by dropping variables that "did not significantly contribute" (specification search); no vintage or holding-period controls; small cells (female 6, no MBA 14, non-U.S./Canada 16); single-variable comparisons are untested.

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An Analysis of Industry Economic Performance in Search Funds

Daniel Lazier, Jacob Thomas, A. J. Wasserstein. (2026)

Yale Case, no number printed, March 13, 2026

Not an independent sample: "this note is effectively an addendum to the demographics note ... we are working from the same dataset, using the same methodology, and the same limitations still exist." (p1). Same 155 exited traditional search funds; cite together with the demographics note, where the inclusion criteria are stated. Headline numbers. Industry counts (figure, p14): software 44, business services 52, healthcare 23, consumer services 12, food and beverage 4, blue-collar services 4, education 3, unidentified 13. "healthcare has a higher median IRR at 39%, compared to 24% for non-healthcare." (p5). "Food and beverage has negative mean and median IRRs, -33% and -49%, respectively" (p7), on four observations. "Our coefficient of determination (R2) is 0.06, meaning only 6% of the dependent variable (IRR) is explained by industry segment. However, the joint F-test is not statistically significant (p = 0.14)" (p18). Healthcare coefficient 0.21, p 0.08; food and beverage -0.48, p 0.06 in the multiple regression. Limits. Authors: classification "involves a combination of art and science"; "Food and beverage and education have too few observations to draw conclusions" (p16); "we are not claiming that industry is irrelevant". Reader's notes: this note defines the top IRR decile as 15 observations while the demographics note used 12 on the same data; no demographic or geography controls; software is 28% of the sample, which matters for readers buying non-software businesses.

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Does Recurring Revenue Really Drive Financial Outcomes in Search Fund-Acquired Businesses?

Daniel Lazier, Jacob Thomas, A. J. Wasserstein. (2025)

Yale Case, no number printed, September 23, 2025

Sample. "we relied on a valuable data set provided by a single generous investor with decades of search fund experience and results." (p2). "the data set consists of 59 observations (Exhibit 1), all of which are traditional search fund projects that have completed the full cycle of raising a fund, acquiring a company, and ultimately exiting." (p2). The investor coded recurring revenue share from each company's confidential information memorandum at acquisition. Returns are masked (indexed 0 to 100 and ranked) at the investor's request. Bins: none 29, low 11, moderate 9, high 10. Included and excluded. Exited traditional search deals from one investor only; no unrealized companies, broken searches or self-funded deals. Recurring revenue measured only at entry. Headline numbers. Indexed MOIC on recurring revenue share: "the t-stat of 1.10 and p-value of 0.27 indicate there is no reliable statistical relationship here." (p12). Indexed IRR: "the low t-stat of 1.32 and high p-value of 0.19 reveal that the slope is not significant." (p12). High versus none medians: "With p-values of 0.40 and 0.92 for indexed MOIC and indexed IRR respectively, we find no significant difference" (p14). Entry price: "a regression line at 1.61, a correlation of 0.36, a t-stat of 2.83, and a low p-value of 0.006." (p16), that is, higher recurring revenue goes with higher entry EBITDA multiples. Limits. Authors: "All our data comes from a single investor, which could introduce sampling bias." and "We are not performing multivariate analyses" (p4); the recurring revenue coding has "some subjectivity" and does not separate contractual from repeat revenue. Reader's notes: the ranked-MOIC relationship in the authors' own table (figure, p14: correlation 0.26, p 0.04) is significant at 5%, yet the text says the ranked results confirm no significance; group sizes of 9 to 10 give little power, so "no significant difference" should not be read as "no effect". The N of 59 matches the value-attribution note but that note describes six investors and this one a single investor; neither says they are the same companies.

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Expanding EBITDA Margins in an ETA Business?

Jacob Thomas, Jeff Stevens, A. J. Wasserstein. (2025)

Don't Expect It, but Don't Lose Hope, Either. Yale Case, no number printed, June 23, 2025

Sample. "A prominent search fund investor who has navigated the ETA jungle for several decades as both an entrepreneur and investor kindly shared with us a dataset consisting of 44 operating company observation points, each with at least three years of post-acquisition revenue and EBITDA" (p2), plus two pre-acquisition years and the margin forecasts in each deal's CIM. Balance sheet data for 33 firms; 33 exits (not necessarily the same 33). Investor not named (co-author Jeff Stevens is identified in an endnote as founder of Anacapa Partners, but the note does not say the data are his). Included and excluded. One investor's portfolio; companies with under three post-acquisition years are excluded, which drops early failures and fast exits; traditional versus self-funded not stated. Headline numbers. "After analyzing financial results from 44 search fund-acquired firms, we did not observe an increase in average EBITDA margins over time." (p1). Forecast: "post-acquisition margins are expected to rise substantially, by approximately 6% of sales ... Only 9 of the 44 firms in our dataset predict a decline in margins" (p4). Actual: "Instead of increasing by 6% of sales, margins actually decline by approximately 10% ... Only 12 out of 44 firms show an increase in margins" (p5). "There is no evidence of a J-curve; instead, there is an L-curve." (p6). "the average entry valuation was 6.0x, while the average exit EBITDA multiple was 14x." (p12). Limits. Authors: "While it is certainly not comprehensive, we believe our analysis is directionally valid." (p2); later-year results are less reliable because winners exit. Reader's notes: no statistical tests; the 6%, 10% and 16% figures are deviations from each firm's own lifetime-average margin in points of sales, not raw margin levels; the claim that CEOs "consciously gave up margins" for asset turnover is asserted, the data show co-movement only.

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The Pernicious Effects of Falling Acquisition Rates in the ETA Ecosystem

Daniel Lazier, Jacob Thomas, A. J. Wasserstein. (2026)

Yale Case, no number printed, July 2, 2026

What is original. The body is a deterministic model of what a falling search acquisition rate does to searchers, fund GPs and LPs. Appendix 1 has the original data: "Three active investors have provided recent SAR data. Although this is a small, non-representative sample, it serves as a directional proxy and should be read as suggestive rather than definitive ... The data set includes 413 unique investments and 348 observable search funds, after eliminating duplicate observations across investors." (p26). "Investor 1 provided all observations through 2017; thereafter, Investors 1, 2, and 3 contributed in balanced proportions." It also re-derives rates from the Stanford study counts for 2005 to 2026. Headline numbers (data). "On a de-duplicated basis, the aggregate SAR ran in the high-50s to mid-60s for the 2019-2021 cohorts (59%, 65%, and 63%) before stepping down to 41% in 2022 and 43% in 2023" (p26). 2024 cohort: "Of the 45 search funds in our study that launched in 2024, 25 have not given up hope ... we predict the terminal SAR of this cohort to be 28.9% ... putting our 95% confidence interval SAR estimate for this cohort at 20% to 40%." (p27). Stanford cumulative rate, as re-computed by the authors: "It climbs from 71% in 2005 to a peak of 78% in 2009, then erodes steadily to 58% by 2026" (p28). Flow rate between Stanford's 2024 and 2026 reports: 54 acquired, 78 quit, 41% (figure, p29); "If readers review the 2026 Stanford study carefully, they will not see the 41% trailing flow rate SAR; we derive that number." (p2). "The true recent trailing rate sits between roughly 41% and 58%." (p30). Headline numbers (model outputs, not observations). "Our calculations indicate that the non-ETA option outperforms the ETA route when the SAR is below about 50%." (p12), on assumed inputs including a $2.25 million terminal equity value taken from Stanford 2024. "LP net MOIC steps down with the SAR, from 2.68x at a 70% SAR (Case A) to 2.53x at 50% (Case B), 2.40x at 40% (Case C), and 2.21x at 30% (Case D)." (p16). Limits. Authors: "The contribution of this note is the implication, not the measurement"; on causes, "these are hypotheses, and we do not have evidence confirming why the SAR is declining."; on the 2024 forecast, "the wide 20% to 40% interval is the more honest summary."; "readers should treat the 50% crossover as a risk-neutral benchmark". Reader's notes: three anonymous investors, geography and search type not stated; pre-2017 data are one investor; self-funded search is neither measured nor modelled; the forecasting model's form is not specified.

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When to Give Up on Your Search Fund Dream

Matt Littell, David Rosner, A. J. Wasserstein. (2023)

Yale Case, no number printed, March 10, 2023

Sample. "we worked with a prominent search fund investor who has a portfolio of 67 search fund operating company investments." (p18); 47 had three or more years of data; 23 were classed, jointly with the investor, as early weak performers; 9 exited early and 14 held. Unrealized positions use the investor's marks at December 31, 2022. The other roughly 17 pages are framework and practitioner vignettes (one fictionalised composite). Headline numbers. "In aggregate, the early exit subset achieved a respectable 19% simple average internal rate of return." versus "the simple average internal rate of return for the companies that did not exit early and held on was negative 9%." (p20). "Seven of the 14 turned the business around into an acceptable performing company." (p20). Limits. Authors: "we do not possess hard data or evidence that four to five years is a magical threshold"; "We certainly wish we had more observations in our data set". Reader's notes: the comparison is 9 companies against 14; 11 of the 14 held are unrealized and valued at marks the investor calls possibly too conservative, which biases against holding; the 19% rests on 4 "lucky" exits of 9; labels were assigned in hindsight. The opening statistics (34% do not acquire, 27% of acquirers destroy wealth) are Stanford 2022 figures, not Yale's.

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How Are ETA CEOs Really Faring?

Daniel Lazier, Alex Schneider, A. J. Wasserstein. (2026)

Yale Case, no number printed, August 11, 2026

Sample. Qualtrics survey: "distributed a reusable, anonymized link to ETA investors, who forwarded it to their operating CEOs, and to other community channels." "We netted 181 observations that we deemed valid and usable for our analysis. These 181 CEOs span every funding model, with exit dates ranging from 2003 to 2026" (p2). 52 fields. No sampling frame or response rate. Per-field n is much lower than 181 (figure, p34): cash compensation 143, equity share at exit 104, personal proceeds 101, MOIC 100, IRR 95. Funding path (n = 181): traditionally funded 122 (67.4%), self-funded 35 (19.3%), accelerator or incubator 15 (8.3%), other 9 (5.0%). 18.3% outside the U.S. and Canada. Included and excluded. "181 ETA CEOs who have exited and whose projects are fully resolved." (p1). Excludes operators who have not exited and searchers who never acquired: "Every figure in this note therefore describes the end of a funnel rather than the entrance to it." (p5). Proceeds are per person, pre-tax, cash at first liquidity event; rollover equity, earnouts and escrows "may be treated inconsistently across respondents". Headline numbers. "Median equity proceeds are $6.0 million, or roughly $964,000 pre-tax for every year invested from search launch to liquidity; however, our sample is a winners' circle, a practical upper bound rather than an expectation, and the distribution is brutally concentrated." (p2). "the median personal proceeds for entrepreneurs are $6.0 million, with an average of $7.7 million ... Nine earned zero, and 20 (including the previously mentioned nine) were below $1 million." (p14). "Of the 101 respondents who reported personal dollar proceeds, 28 (27.7%) garnered $10 million or more on a pre-tax basis." (p15). "Cash compensation clusters tightly around a $200,000 median" (p19); "28% of CEOs took an initial pay cut" (p20). "The typical company enters with $1.88 million in EBITDA and exits with $4.0 million. The median MOIC and IRR land at 5.0x and 40.0%, respectively." (p8 to p9). Self-funded versus traditional (the comparison Stanford and IESE do not have). Ownership: "Traditionally funded searchers hold a median of 18.5% in equity, while self-funded searchers hold 75%" (p13; n = 70 and 17; Mann-Whitney p < 0.001). Proceeds: "by funding structure the medians run $6.6 million for traditional projects, $4.9 million for accelerators, and $4.0 million for self-funded" (p16; n = 68, 11 and 16), and the gap is not significant ("neither gap approaches significance (p = 0.741 and p = 0.646)", p24). Entry size: "Traditionally funded searches buy at a median of $2.0 million, while self-funded searchers buy roughly two-fifths the size, $0.85 million" (p11; p = 0.001). Pay: "traditionally funded projects see a median rise of 50%, whereas self-funded projects take a median cut of 16.3%" (p20). Salary medians $214,000 traditional (n = 95) versus $190,000 self-funded (n = 27) (figure, p20). Against Stanford. "just 14% of our sample falls below 2.0x MOIC, compared with 47% to 59% in the Stanford and Yale studies; only 10% lost money ..., against 26% in the Stanford study and 32% in the Yale study; and 28% reach griffin status, compared with 8% and 2%, respectively." (p7). The authors use this to show their sample is skewed to winners. Limits. Authors: "it is self-selected and non-random, not a representative sample ... Neither the outcome levels nor the relationships between variables can be projected onto the full ETA CEO population" (p6); the link travelled through investor networks "to which self-funded searchers have the loosest ties; the self-funded cells, therefore, carry a second layer of selection"; on self-funded downside, "our reported floor is zero and theirs is not" (personal guarantees and own capital are not netted); "this section reports more than sixty distinct comparisons. Run that many and about three will look meaningful by luck alone." (p24). Reader's notes: all figures self-reported and unverified; no inflation adjustment stated across 2003 to 2026 exits; the headline annualised figure ($964,368) is identical to the traditionally funded cell, the self-funded cell is $844,507 (n = 16, figure, p36); self-funded n varies by field from 14 to 27.

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Searcher Sentiment During the ETA Journey: Baseline Findings from a Longitudinal Study

Mark Agnew, A. J. Wasserstein. (2026)

Yale Case, no number printed, September 30, 2026

Sample. "In spring 2026, we looked for new searchers planning to launch in 2026, across every structure and geography, and 83 responded." (p2), recruited through investors, MBA clubs, ETA faculty and social media. 31-question Qualtrics survey plus an eight-item grit scale and an optional 60-item HEXACO personality module (53 opted in). Planned as nine waves over two years. Structure (figure, p6): traditionally funded 54 (65%), self-funded 13 (16%), accelerator 6, holding company 6, other 4. 35% searching outside the U.S. and Canada. "We cannot know what share of the 2026 search launches our sample represents" (p3). Headline numbers. Self-estimated odds of acquiring: "the average answer is 78%, the median is 80%" (n = 79, p8), against "The current marketplace SAR sits in the 30% to 50% range, so a reader could call 78% hubris." (p9). Stress "an average of 4.8 and a median of 5.0 on a 0-to-10 scale" (p7). Motivation: "Wealth creation ranks last among the four named drivers at 16%, behind the opportunity to operate and run a business at 36%" (p5). Funding: "The majority of our sample lives on a formal search stipend (61%), while 18% are bolstered by their partner's income, and 13% pay the full freight out of pocket." (p6). Self-funded: "The self-funded searchers have longer financial runways (5 of 13 report five years or more)." (p6 to p7). Grit mean 3.96 against a published adult average of about 3.4. Limits. Authors: opt-in, self-reported, single point in time before any outcome; "interpret the data presented here as directional until the later waves."; the authors suspect the real 2026 field has more self-funded launches than their 16%. Reader's notes: self-funded (n = 13) is folded into "other structures" in every statistical cut; the text says no t-test is significant while its own table flags two at the 10% level; a footnote states "We used Claude Opus 5 for the statistical analysis in this note."

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Exploring Post-exit Dynamics for Search Fund Entrepreneurs

Keith Burns, A. J. Wasserstein. (2024)

Yale Case, no number printed, December 10, 2024

Sample. "we built a data set by surveying 151 traditional search fund CEOs who have exited. Of the 151 CEOs we queried, we received valid anonymous responses from 57." (p2); CEOs were sourced through investors. "According to the 2024 Stanford Graduate School of Business Search Fund Study, 160 of all search fund companies have exited. Our data set captures 35% of those exits." (p2). Field dates, geography and per-question n: not stated. Self-funded searchers excluded by construction. Headline numbers. "77% of our exits were to PE or PE-linked entities. Only 19% of our respondents were purchased by strategic buyers" (p2). "80% of CEOs remained with the acquiring company for at least six months, with 63% staying more than one year ... The average and median time frame with the new capital partners was two years." (p3). "A complete 65% of CEOs rolled some equity into the new transaction ... for those CEOs exiting to financial buyers, the median roll was 30%." (p3 to p4). "58% of CEOs evaluated their relationship with the new equity partners as getting worse or much worse." (p7). "This translates into an NPS score of negative 33" (p12). "61% of CEOs who continue to serve in an executive capacity in the recapped deal receive some equity ... Financial partners grant a median 4.8% additional equity points." (p18). Limits. Authors: "There might be reporting biases, and we sourced the CEOs who exited from investors, so we might have concentrated exposure to some investors"; the analysis is one-directional (CEO views only). Reader's notes: subgroup cells are very small; retrospective self-report; the 35% coverage claim does not show the 57 are all inside Stanford's 160; no tests. Endurance Search Partners and Goodwin figures quoted in the note are third-party.

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Exploring Entrepreneur Partnerships in the Search Fund Ecosystem

Lacey H. Wismer, Billy Bennett, A. J. Wasserstein. (2024)

Yale Case, no number printed, August 1, 2024

Sample. "we surveyed 190 ETA CEOs, current searchers who have not yet purchased a company, and prospective searchers contemplating ETA on topics related to partnerships." (p3). Breakdown (figure, p26): 69 current CEOs (56 partnered, 13 solo), 93 actively searching, 23 planning to search, 5 closed without acquiring. Distribution method, response rate, dates, geography and funding type: not stated. Headline numbers. "Of the survey participants in a partnership who were either currently operating a company or still searching, 98% rated their partnership very good or good" (p8). "93% of CEO partners had a direct personal relationship with their partner prior to launching a search ... Business school is fertile ground for finding a partner, with 42% of all partnerships finding their mate there." (p14). "44% of CEO partnerships created this type of document before officially engaging." (a written partnership agreement, p14). "for solo CEOs operating a business, 8% said they always wish they had a partner, and 46% claimed they often wish they had a partner." (p9). Limits. Authors: "we think it is premature to conclusively say partnerships supersede soloships". Reader's notes: strong survivorship (only 5 respondents closed without acquiring; broken partnerships are unlikely to answer); the solo-CEO percentages rest on 13 people; denominators shift between statements; the partnered-IRR figures in the note (40.5% versus 30.3%) are Stanford's, and Yale's own demographics study above does not find a significant partnership effect.

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Why MBA Students Do Not Pursue Entrepreneurship through Acquisition

A. J. Wasserstein, Mark Anderegg, Carlos Gila, Jason Pananos. (2022)

Yale Case, no number printed, June 30, 2022

Sample. "We identified 18 schools with a formal ETA course and asked faculty members to share our survey with their students. Thirteen schools (Figure 1) participated in our project, with the survey being sent to 880 students, of which 369 completed the study (a 42% response rate)." (p2). Schools include Berkeley, Booth, Cambridge, Columbia, HBS, IE, IESE, Indiana, Kellogg, LBS, Ross, Tuck and Yale (figure, p5). Headline numbers. "the 52 students launching a search fund represent 6% of the students in our data set who were exposed to ETA in a formal course." and "a scant 1% of the total student population." (p4). "137 (37%) students had no intention of ever engaging in ETA, and 182 (49%) planned to embrace ETA within the next five years" (p6). "Of the 52 students actually inaugurating a search fund, the vast majority (67%) plan to do so through a traditionally funded model. Self-funded searchers are the second most favored approach with 18%" (p4). Top reasons by count (figure, p6): need more experience 153, too risky 120, geographic risk 91, want more cash compensation 88. "60% of students believed they need more experience" (p7); "55% of students noted that ETA was too risky for them." (p8). Limits. The authors state no sampling limits. Reader's notes: the three intent groups sum to 371, not 369; the survey was sent by ETA faculty to their own students; intent is stated, not observed; the text gives accelerator 4% and holding company 2% where the figure shows 8% and 4%. A companion HBS listing of this note exists (not opened; see leads).

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On the Nature of CEO Time Allocation in an SME

Danny Qiao, Brent Beshore, A. J. Wasserstein. (2021)

Yale Case, no number printed, March 30, 2021

Sample. "We are grateful to 301 CEOs who kindly participated in our survey" (p4), distributed through the Young Presidents Organization, the Entrepreneurs' Organization and "multiple search fund investors with SME businesses in their portfolios" (p2); SME defined as under $50 million revenue. A second survey of "118 Yale School of Management MBA candidates" used the same questionnaire (p22). Response rates and dates not stated; share of search fund CEOs not quantified. Headline numbers. "The CEOs surveyed indicated that people issues, strategy, operational issues, and sales are the largest functional categories of CEO time allocation" (p5); counts (figure, p6): people issues 165, operational issues 150, strategy 145, sales 123. "Our CEOs scored the fun of being a CEO as an eight on a scale of one to ten." (p14) and difficulty "a seven out of ten" (p15); students guessed harder (9) and less fun (7). Limits. Authors: "Our sample is heavily skewed toward service businesses. This likely reflects our survey distribution channels which over-solicited search fund CEOs". Reader's notes: recalled self-report, not a time diary; sitting CEOs only; no tests. Not ETA-specific.

Source

Exploring Six Key Decisions Post-Exit Entrepreneurs Will Have to Make

Jeff Swearingen, A. J. Wasserstein. (2025)

Yale Case, no number printed, February 17, 2025

Sample. "We targeted post-exit entrepreneurs with a net worth of at least $10 million ... Of the 60 replies we received, 52 met the target audience requirements and constitute the data set." (p2). Mixed founders and acquirers; the split is not stated, so this is not search fund data. Number queried, dates and geography not stated. Headline numbers. "The average age at exit is 42 ... The average net worth at exit is $15 million, and the average net worth today is $32 million." (p2). "only 20% of post-exit entrepreneurs allocated time and energy to thinking about post-exit life." (p2). "The good news is that 41% of those surveyed agree or strongly agree that they have found a new purpose and self-definition. However, that means 59% have not." (p25). Limits. Reader's notes: convenience sample of the authors' network; the text gives average exit age as 42 on p2 and 48 on p8, and calls $32 million an average on p2 and a median on p25.

Source

Exploring Search Fund Entrepreneur Economics

Nikhil Goel, Niel Wyma, Ron Wexler, Brian O'Connor, A. J. Wasserstein. (2023)

Yale Case, no number printed, July 23, 2023

A spreadsheet model, not data. Base case: $2 million EBITDA bought at 5x with 50% debt, $500,000 search budget with 50% step-up, 25% equity pool, five-year hold, 7x exit. "If an entrepreneur proceeds through this scenario, they will deliver a 26% IRR and procure $2.6 million for their efforts over a two-year search and a five-year operating period." (p8). Reaching $10 million requires roughly $3 million starting EBITDA, 4.5x entry, 60% debt, 12% growth and a 9x exit together (p14). The only empirical anchor is Stanford's: "only 27 search fund companies out of 166 have delivered $10 million-plus windfalls to entrepreneurs" (2022 study, p1). Every dollar figure is conditional on assumed inputs, with two turns of multiple expansion built in and no failure scenario.

Source

Engineering EBITDA Multiple Expansion and the Paramount Role of Investment Bankers in ETA Exits

Leslie Cheek IV, Peter S. Kies, A. J. Wasserstein. (2026)

Yale Case, no number printed, June 26, 2026

Practitioner guide to running a banker-led sale. The 80% multiple-expansion figure and 6.3x to 15.6x multiples it opens with are imported from the value-attribution note above and should be cited there. The authors say plainly: "We do not present any empirical research or data to support our claim that investment bankers are the lynchpin in an exit and essential for EBITDA multiple growth." (p2 to p3). Reader's note: two of the three authors are identified in the endnotes as Baird investment bankers, and the note recommends "fair to generous" banker fees.

Source

A Proposal on Equity Pooling for Search Fund Entrepreneurs

Peter Bransden, Raam S. Jani, Mark Agnew, A. J. Wasserstein. (2023)

Yale Case, no number printed, April 30, 2023

Proposes that cohorts of about ten searchers each commit 20% of earned equity to a shared pool. All numbers are from a hypothetical ten-person model ("the ten participants created $27.8 million of net equity value", "each cohort member would receive almost $600,000", p4) built to "loosely" mirror Stanford 2022 outcomes excluding the top five. The authors call it "inchoate" and answer seven design questions with "We are not sure."

Source

On the Nature of Due Diligence in a Search Fund Acquisition

Andrew Seth Jacobs, A. J. Wasserstein. (2022)

Yale Case, no number printed, May 6, 2022

A 31-page primer organised as preliminary then confirmatory diligence across eight pillars, with two first-person searcher vignettes and about 20 practitioners consulted. Useful practice heuristics, none of them findings: "We recommend searchers enter an exclusivity period with 8-12 overall key bets" (p18); an illustrative budget (figure, p27, "Prepared by case writers") of $30,000 to $40,000 for quality of earnings and $75,000 to $125,000 for legal diligence, with transaction legal work "approximately $100,000 to $200,000 per deal" on top.

Source

On the Nature of a Search Fund Not Working Out as Planned

Ryan Leibowitz, A. J. Wasserstein, Mark Agnew, Brian O'Connor. (2020)

Yale Case, no number printed, July 31, 2020

Six named searchers' first-person accounts, sorted into three archetypes (no-dealer, imploder, drifter); argues the drifter is worst because of the time cost. All statistics are third-party: "A full 31% of searches launched do not result in an acquisition. Of the 69% of searchers who do close a deal, an additional 29% of searches end in a partial or total loss of equity" (Stanford 2018, p3). The "over 50% of searches do not meet the common definition of success" line is the authors' own combination of those Stanford figures, not a Stanford-reported number.

Source

On the Nature of Entry Multiples

Chris Gates, A. J. Wasserstein, Mark Agnew, Brian O'Connor. (2020)

Yale Case, no number printed, October 7, 2020

Argues entry multiple matters less than growth and hold period, using hypothetical scenario tables (for example a "Single" outcome returns 19%, 14% and 10% IRR at 5x, 6x and 7x entry, p5). The cited empirical figures are third-party: "Stanford's 2018 study on search funds found that the median entry multiple for those looking to acquire a business was 6.3x." (p2) and a Capital Dynamics and TU Munich study of 701 private equity exits. Models are unlevered and give both comparison companies a 10x exit.

Source

On the Nature of Long-term Holds: Why Entrepreneurs Should Embrace this Strategy

A. J. Wasserstein, Mark Agnew, Brian O'Connor. (2020)

Yale Case, no number printed, May 28, 2020 (revised September 17, 2023)

Argues owners of good businesses should hold for decades because each sale leaks value to tax, fees, idle cash and redeployment risk. Six practitioner interviews by Wasserstein (March to April 2020) plus compounding illustrations: "avoiding the exit nets $24.9 million, while exiting and paying capital gains taxes five times nets $16.8 million" (p7), on assumed 15% growth, 25 years and 25% tax. The authors concede survivor bias and that "our math is overly simplified". All dollar results are model outputs.

Source

On the Nature of Women Considering a Search Fund Launch

Minahil Nawaz, Sara Rosenthal, Lacey Wismer, Ryan Robinson, A. J. Wasserstein. (2021)

Yale Case, no number printed, June 23, 2021

Seven hurdles and mitigations, drawn from an unstated number of interviews. No author-run survey; charts come from the Women's Search Network annual survey, whose own caveat is quoted: its data "represent known female searchers who responded to the WSN's annual survey but may not be representative". "fewer than 25 of those individuals have been women launching U.S.-based, traditionally funded searches." (p5, footnoted to WSN; the less-than-10-percent share is Stanford 2020). Small WSN cells (n = 15 and n = 45). Two co-authors are WSN founders.

Source

Exploring Franchisees as a Post-MBA Entrepreneurial Path

Peter Mistretta, Jim Sharpe, A. J. Wasserstein. (2023)

Yale Case, no number printed, April 10, 2023

Argues multi-unit franchisee platforms deserve consideration by MBA searchers. The one survey-like number is a co-author's tally: "Jim Sharpe ... estimates in a survey of 187 ETA businesses purchased by Harvard Business School graduates in the past decade that 19 (or 10%) purchased franchise operations" (p2), method not stated and one school only. Unit economics tables are hand-picked brands from franchise disclosure documents. Co-author Mistretta runs a franchise holding company.

Source

Do Search Fund CEOs Improve Performance?

A. J. Wasserstein (interview). (2026)

Yale Insights, "Three Questions" department, April 30, 2026

Short Q and A summarising the value-attribution note for a general audience; the page credits the analysis to Wasserstein and accounting scholar Jacob Thomas. States "enterprise value grew from approximately $1 billion to $4 billion, with roughly 80% of that increase attributable to EBITDA multiple expansion", "EBITDA multiples rose from 6.3x at entry to 15.6x at exit, on average" and "EBITDA margins decline from 25% at entry to 19% at exit". It does not give the sample size or exclusions; take those from the case note.

Source

Exploring Various Search Fund Structures

Nicholas Rice, A. J. Wasserstein. (2021)

Yale Case, no number printed, August 19, 2021

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Searching for a Search Fund Structure: A Student Takes a Tour of Various Options

A. J. Wasserstein. (2017)

Yale SOM Case 17-016, August 18, 2017

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Exploring Holding Companies in the Search Fund Ecosystem

Trish Higgins, Rich Littlehale, A. J. Wasserstein. (2024)

Yale Case, no number printed, May 23, 2024

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

A Reference Guide on European Search Funds

Jürgen Rilling, Simon Webster, Peter Bransden, A. J. Wasserstein. (2023)

Yale Case, no number printed, August 6, 2023

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Exploring the Future of Entrepreneurship through Acquisition

Jeff Stevens, A. J. Wasserstein. (2023)

Yale Case, no number printed, November 13, 2023

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Patterns in Entrepreneurship

A. J. Wasserstein, Joseph N. Golden. (2020)

Yale Case, no number printed, March 12, 2020

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Exploring and Understanding the U.S

Jacob Wirz, Heather Endresen, A. J. Wasserstein. (2025)

Small Business Administration 7(a) Loan Program. Yale Case, no number printed, February 5, 2025

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Ahron Oddman and Old North Bank

David Cotton, A. J. Wasserstein. (2021)

Yale Case, no number printed, September 30, 2021

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Attempting to Enter a Franchise System as a Self- funded Searcher Can Be a Roller-coaster Ride

Nathan Shantz, A. J. Wasserstein. (2024)

Yale Case, no number printed, June 7, 2024

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

What Is Your Why for Launching a Search Fund?

Jeff Stevens, A. J. Wasserstein. (2025)

Yale Case, no number printed, May 20, 2025

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Eight Questions Aspiring Search Fund Entrepreneurs Should Consider Before Launching Their Project

Narbe Alexandrian, Matt Littell, A. J. Wasserstein. (2023)

Yale Case, no number printed, December 4, 2023

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Ten Reasons to Absolutely not Pursue Entrepreneurship through Acquisition

Narbe Alexandrian, A. J. Wasserstein. (2023)

Yale Case, no number printed, October 23, 2023

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

How to Prepare for a Search Fund During Your MBA

Elizabeth Davidson, Greg Geronemus, A. J. Wasserstein, Mark Agnew, Brian O'Connor. (2020)

Yale Case, no number printed, September 30, 2020

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Garth Parker Considers a Post-MBA Search Fund and Other Career Choices

Joe Higgins, Felix Cardenas, A. J. Wasserstein. (2022)

Yale Case, no number printed, December 10, 2022

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Do You Have What It Takes to Be an Entrepreneur?

Grace Freedman, Tim Ludwig, A. J. Wasserstein. (2021)

Yale Case, no number printed, July 31, 2021

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

On the Nature of Passion in an Entrepreneurial Journey

Jeanne Odendaal, A. J. Wasserstein. (2021)

Yale Case, no number printed, March 22, 2021

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Exploring Search Fund Entrepreneurship Using Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs as a Framework

Nathan Shantz, Mark Agnew, A. J. Wasserstein. (2023)

Yale Case, no number printed, August 11, 2023

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Check Your Strategy and Capital Allocation Aspirations

Trish Higgins, A. J. Wasserstein. (2023)

Yale Case, no number printed, August 16, 2023

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

What Are You Optimizing in Your Post-MBA Career?

Abigail R. Kies, A. J. Wasserstein. (2024)

Yale Case, no number printed, July 25, 2024

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

A Framework to Contemplate Post-MBA Career Paths

Fan Wen, A. J. Wasserstein. (2020)

Yale Case, no number printed, January 15, 2020

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Working at a Small Business as a Post-MBA Career Choice

A. J. Wasserstein, Dwayne Luquetta. (2020)

Yale Case, no number printed, December 28, 2020

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

I Said, You Said: She's the Entrepreneur

A. J. Wasserstein. (2020)

Yale Case, no number printed, January 14, 2020

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

I Said, You Said: He's the Entrepreneur

A. J. Wasserstein. (2019)

Yale SOM Case 19-019 per catalogue, July 14, 2019 (revised June 30, 2020)

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

On the Nature of Work-Life Integration as a Search Fund CEO

Steve Divitkos, Jim Sharpe, A. J. Wasserstein. (2022)

Yale Case, no number printed, September 10, 2022

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Questions Aspiring Search Fund Entrepreneurs and Potential Investors Might Ask Each Other

Niel Wyma, A. J. Wasserstein. (2023)

Yale Case, no number printed, February 14, 2023

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

What Exactly Search Fund Investors Do, and Don't Do, for Entrepreneurs

Brian D. Wolfe, Jeff Stevens, A. J. Wasserstein. (2025)

Yale Case, no number printed, March 26, 2025

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Exploring Bilateral Conflicts of Interest Between Entrepreneurs and Investors in Search Fund Projects

Alex Hodgkin, Matt Littell, A. J. Wasserstein. (2026)

Yale Case, no number printed, January 10, 2026

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Sumit Aneja: Getting the Right Investors

A. J. Wasserstein. (2018)

Yale SOM Case 18-019, September 1, 2018

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Bovard and Majid

Allison Mishkin, A. J. Wasserstein. (2019)

Yale SOM Case 19-015, August 26, 2019

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Including Employees in a Search Fund Waterfall

Raam S. Jani, Mark Agnew, A. J. Wasserstein. (2023)

Yale Case, no number printed, August 6, 2023

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

On the Nature of What Business Sellers Are Looking for in a Buyer

Adam Wilver, A. J. Wasserstein. (2022)

Yale Case, no number printed, May 2, 2022

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

On the Nature of Seller Selection in a Search Fund Project

Mark Anderegg, Lucas Braun, Jürgen Rilling, Ryan Robinson, A. J. Wasserstein. (2021)

Yale Case, no number printed, December 10, 2021

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

On the Nature of Modeling and Valuation in a Search Fund Acquisition

Nikhil Goel, Aude Flecchia, Adam Wilver, Alexander Mears, Steve Ressler, Jacob Thomas, A. J. Wasserstein. (2022)

Yale Case, no number printed, December 23, 2022

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

On the Nature of Economic Characteristics

Vish Mazumder, A. J. Wasserstein, Mark Agnew, Brian O'Connor. (2020)

Yale Case, no number printed, June 25, 2020

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

On the Nature of Revenue

Mark Agnew, Brian O'Connor, A. J. Wasserstein. (2020)

Yale Case, no number printed, April 4, 2020

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

On the Nature of Debt

Mark Agnew, Brian O'Connor, A. J. Wasserstein. (2020)

Yale Case, no number printed, May 15, 2020

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

On the Nature of Customer Attrition and Revenue Analysis

Manas Punhani, Will Bressman, G. J. King, A. J. Wasserstein. (2021)

Yale Case, no number printed, May 12, 2021

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

On the Nature of Working Capital Understanding its Mysteries and Complexities

David Cotton, Trish Higgins, James Higgins, A. J. Wasserstein. (2021)

Yale Case, no number printed, November 25, 2021

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Exploring Earnouts and Their Use in Search Fund Acquisitions

Robin Mohapatra, Niel Wyma, A. J. Wasserstein. (2025)

Yale Case, no number printed, September 29, 2025

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Exploring and Understanding the Various Legal Documents in a Search Fund Project

Kevin Christmas, Kevin D. Grumberg, Jon M. Herzog, Raam S. Jani, Reed F. Leigh, Francesco Salpietro, A. J. Wasserstein. (2024)

Yale Case, no number printed, November 15, 2024

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Exploring How to Partner with a Law Firm for a Search Fund Project

Raam S. Jani, A. J. Wasserstein. (2024)

Yale Case, no number printed, July 1, 2024

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Exploring the Role Accounting Firms Play in a Search Fund Project

Ryan J. Turbes, CPA, Clay Brownlee, CPA, A. J. Wasserstein. (2025)

Yale Case, no number printed, April 15, 2025

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

On the Nature of Building an Internship Program in a Search Fund Project

Greg Geronemus, David Rosner, A. J. Wasserstein. (2022)

Yale Case, no number printed, July 12, 2022

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Search Fund Company Boards: How CEOs Can Build Boards to Help Them Thrive

A. J. Wasserstein, Jason Pananos. (2018)

Yale SOM Case 18-017, August 10, 2018

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Some Thoughts on How to be an Effective and Impactful Director on a Search Fund Board

Rob LeBlanc, A. J. Wasserstein. (2023)

Yale Case, no number printed, July 10, 2023

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

A New CEOs Checklist for Quickly Understanding and Leading a Business

A. J. Wasserstein, Mark Anderegg. (2022)

Yale Case, no number printed, September 14, 2022

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Exploring the CEO's Leadership Role in a Search Fund-Acquired Small Business

Jeff Stevens, Mark Anderegg, A. J. Wasserstein. (2024)

Yale Case, no number printed, February 1, 2024

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

On the Nature of CEO Communication Patterns in a Small Business

Daniel Rellaford, Todd Tracey, Trish Higgins, Mark Anderegg, A. J. Wasserstein. (2022)

Yale Case, no number printed, August 31, 2022

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Exploring Open-Book Management in a Search Fund-Acquired Small Business

Steve Divitkos, A. J. Wasserstein. (2024)

Yale Case, no number printed, January 17, 2024

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Cash Management Principles in a Small Business

Mason Scisco, Lacey H. Wismer, Billy Bennett, A. J. Wasserstein. (2023)

Yale Case, no number printed, September 25, 2023

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

A Primer on Breakeven Analysis

Jacob Thomas, A. J. Wasserstein. (2024)

Yale Case, no number printed, April 26, 2024

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Exploring Risk Mitigation Concepts in a Search Fund Company

August Felker, A. J. Wasserstein. (2024)

Yale Case, no number printed, July 9, 2024

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Exploring Employee Terminations in Search Fund-Acquired Companies and Small Businesses

Matthew LoCastro, A. J. Wasserstein. (2025)

Yale Case, no number printed, February 13, 2025

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Some Thoughts on Managing Blue-Collar Team Members in a Search Fund-Acquired Business

Brian D. Wolfe, Matt Littell, A. J. Wasserstein. (2025)

Yale Case, no number printed, August 13, 2025

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Exploring How to Build a Training and Development Program in a Search Fund-Acquired Business

Kalil Diaz, A. J. Wasserstein. (2025)

Yale Case, no number printed, June 15, 2025

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Exploring Business Operating Systems in Search Fund-Acquired Companies

Alex Hodgkin, Matt Littell, A. J. Wasserstein. (2025)

Yale Case, no number printed, September 9, 2025

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Customer Service is the Underappreciated Compounding Asset of ETA

Germán Canale Segovia, A. J. Wasserstein. (2026)

Yale Case, no number printed, July 22, 2026

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Three Concepts Search Fund Entrepreneurs Can Learn from Family Businesses

Nick Di Loreto, A. J. Wasserstein. (2025)

Yale Case, no number printed, June 11, 2025

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

The Evolution of a Search Fund CEO and Company

Kent Weaver, John Palfreyman, A. J. Wasserstein. (2020)

Yale Case, no number printed, May 15, 2020

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Kalil Diaz: Leadership Conundrums in a Search Fund-acquired Company

Mason Scisco, A. J. Wasserstein. (2024)

Yale Case, no number printed, November 11, 2024

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Kalil Diaz: A DR-based Search Firm Considers its First Acquisition

A. J. Wasserstein. (2017)

Yale SOM Case 17-014, August 1, 2017

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Germán Canale: Ice, Ice, Baby

Mason Scisco, A. J. Wasserstein. (2023)

Yale Case, no number printed, July 14, 2023

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

On the Nature of Programmatic Acquisition Strategies: Why Entrepreneurs Should Consider This Approach

Joseph N. Golden, A. J. Wasserstein, Mark Agnew, Brian O'Connor. (2020)

Yale Case, no number printed, August 27, 2020

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

On the Nature of Programmatic Acquisition Strategies: How to Source Deals

Joseph N. Golden, A. J. Wasserstein, Mark Agnew, Brian O'Connor. (2020)

Yale Case, no number printed, October 30, 2020

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

On the Nature of Programmatic Acquisition Strategies: Their Implementation

Joseph N. Golden, A. J. Wasserstein, Mark Anderegg. (2021)

Yale Case, no number printed, January 25, 2021

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

On the Nature of Programmatic Acquisition Strategies: Why Things Go Awry

Joseph N. Golden, Mark Anderegg, A. J. Wasserstein, Alex de Pfyffer. (2021)

Yale Case, no number printed, April 8, 2021

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Exploring an Integration Framework in a Programmatic Acquisition Strategy

Keith Burns, A. J. Wasserstein. (2024)

Yale Case, no number printed, August 15, 2024

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

On the Nature of Long-term Holds: How Entrepreneurs Can Operationalize this Approach

Jeanne Odendaal, Tim Ludwig, A. J. Wasserstein. (2021)

Yale Case, no number printed, February 15, 2021

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Ari Santiago and CompassMSP

Joseph N. Golden, A. J. Wasserstein. (2022)

Yale Case, no number printed, September 20, 2022

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

KBP Foods and Barry Dubin

Joseph N. Golden, A. J. Wasserstein. (2022)

Yale Case, no number printed, January 24, 2022

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Stotz Equipment's Growth through Acquisition Strategy (A)

Jeanne Odendaal, A. J. Wasserstein. (2020)

Yale Case, no number printed, September 30, 2020

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Stotz Equipment's Growth through Acquisition Strategy (B)

Jeanne Odendaal, A. J. Wasserstein. (2020)

Yale Case, no number printed, September 30, 2020

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Krueger-Gilbert Health Physics

A. J. Wasserstein, Jason Pananos. (2019)

Yale SOM Case 19-014, September 3, 2019

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Quench USA

Chris Gates, A. J. Wasserstein. (2020)

Yale Case, no number printed, June 5, 2020

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Smith Brothers Insurance: Managing Successions at a Growing Insurance Agency

Jason Pananos, A. J. Wasserstein. (2019)

Yale SOM Case 19-012, June 12, 2019

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Scott Duncan - Exploring a Search Fund Bankruptcy

Scott Duncan, A. J. Wasserstein. (2025)

Yale Case, no number printed, August 25, 2025

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

The Judd Lorson Story

Judd Lorson, A. J. Wasserstein. (2022)

Yale Case, no number printed, May 26, 2022

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

OnRamp Prepares for an Exit (A)

Elizabeth Davidson, David Dodson, A. J. Wasserstein. (2021)

Yale Case, no number printed, January 20, 2021

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

OnRamp Prepares for an Exit (B)

Elizabeth Davidson, David Dodson, A. J. Wasserstein. (2021)

Yale Case, no number printed, January 20, 2021

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Exploring How ETA CEOs and Private Equity Buyers Can Better Collaborate After an Acquisition

Alex Hodgkin, A. J. Wasserstein. (2025)

Yale Case, no number printed, July 25, 2025

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

A Dozen Questions to Consider After Selling Your Business

Mark Agnew, A. J. Wasserstein. (2024)

Yale Case, no number printed, February 26, 2024

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

What's Next: The Entrepreneur's Epilogue and the Paradox of Success

Jeanne Odendaal, Rick Eigenbrod, A. J. Wasserstein, Mark Agnew, Brian O'Connor. (2020)

Yale Case, no number printed, September 9, 2020

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

What's Next?

A. J. Wasserstein. (2017)

Search Fund Entrepreneurs Reflect on Life After Exit. Yale SOM Case 17-019, November 17, 2017

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Mac Holland Considers His Third Chapter

A. J. Wasserstein. (2023)

Yale Case, no number printed, August 18, 2023

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

A Call to Philanthropy in the Search Fund Ecosystem

A. J. Wasserstein, Greg Geronemus, David Rosner, Jim Sharpe, Jan Simon. (2022)

Yale Case, no number printed, August 1, 2022

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Profiles in Entrepreneurial Excellence - A Holistic Approach

Elaine Kelch, Blake Winchell, A. J. Wasserstein. (2023)

Yale Case, no number printed, February 27, 2023

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Doug Cook: Exploring a 10x10+ entrepreneur

Mark Anderegg, A. J. Wasserstein. (2024)

Yale Case, no number printed, February 1, 2024

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Ten Essential Questions to Consider When Selecting a Franchise Brand for a Search Fund Journey

Peter Mistretta, Michael Horowitz, Adam Wilver, A. J. Wasserstein. (2023)

Yale Case, no number printed, May 23, 2023

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Examining the Franchise Disclosure Document

Graham P. Weihmiller, A. J. Wasserstein. (2023)

Yale Case, no number printed, September 8, 2023

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Exploring the Shared Services Function When Scaling a Multi-unit Franchise Operation

Matt Beck, A. J. Wasserstein. (2024)

Yale Case, no number printed, July 8, 2024

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Jacob Lee and Scenthound

Nathan Shantz, A. J. Wasserstein. (2024)

Yale Case, no number printed, March 20, 2024

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

European Wax Center in Manhattan

Joseph Golden, A. J. Wasserstein. (2019)

Yale SOM Case 19-020 per catalogue, which dates it October 17, 2019; the PDF header reads December 17, 2019

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Khalil Tawil and Umi: A Startup Project That Checked All the Right Boxes

Khalil Tawil, A. J. Wasserstein. (2020)

Yale SOM Case 19-022 per catalogue, which dates it December 28, 2019; the PDF header reads January 15, 2020

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Khalil Tawil and Umi (B): The Epilogue

Khalil Tawil, A. J. Wasserstein. (2020)

Yale SOM Case 19-023 per catalogue, which dates it December 28, 2019; the PDF header reads January 15, 2020

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Mike Erwin: An Accidental Social Entrepreneur

A. J. Wasserstein. (2017)

Yale SOM Case 17-018, October 11, 2017

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

FARM: An Impact Investing Collaborative

Patrick Sissman, A. J. Wasserstein. (2018)

Yale SOM Case 18-022, December 28, 2018

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

A Value-Creation Journey

A. J. Wasserstein. (2020)

Yale Case, no number printed, June 1, 2020

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Some Thoughts for Graduating MBA Students

John Palfreyman, A. J. Wasserstein. (2020)

Yale Case, no number printed, January 29, 2020

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

MBA Graduates Pay It Forward - Advice from graduating MBA students for entering MBA students

Elizabeth Davidson, A. J. Wasserstein. (2020)

Yale Case, no number printed, September 25, 2020

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

On the Nature of Teaching in an MBA Program

A. J. Wasserstein, Elizabeth Davidson. (2021)

Yale Case, no number printed, January 10, 2021

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

A Primer on How to Get the Most Out of My Courses

Ayesha Chokhani, A. J. Wasserstein. (2022)

Yale Case, no number printed, March 16, 2022

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Some Thoughts and Helpful Hints for Preparing Midterm and Final Submissions in My Courses

A. J. Wasserstein (no author line printed; listed on his faculty page). (2022)

Yale Case, no number printed, December 1, 2022

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Questions To Consider Before Starting the Process to Sell Your Business

Joshua Cascade. (2025)

Yale Case 25-020, May 25, 2025 (catalogue page shows "Published: July 23, 2025")

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)

Course syllabus: MGT 671 Entrepreneurship Through Acquisition, Fall 1 2024

A. J. Wasserstein. (2024)

SourceVERIFIED (existence only)