E1FT50
Bloom, N., & Van Reenen, J. (2007)
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4), 1351-1408
Management practice survey of 732 medium-sized firms in the US, France, Germany and UK. Practices correlate with productivity, profitability and survival; there is "a long tail of extremely badly managed firms"; poor practices are more prevalent under weak competition and when family firms pass control to the eldest son. This is the empirical basis for the claim that outside management can improve owner-run mid-sized firms.
Sourcedoi:10.1162/qjec.2007.122.4.13512355 citations (OpenAlex)
E2FT50
Bloom, N., Sadun, R., & Van Reenen, J. (2012)
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(4), 1663-1705
Almost 4,000 firms in the US, Europe and Asia. Trust raises decentralisation and, through reallocation, aggregate productivity. Background for delegation limits in owner-centric firms.
Sourcedoi:10.1093/qje/qje029736 citations (OpenAlex)
E3FT50
Bennedsen, M., Pérez-González, F., & Wolfenzon, D. (2020)
Evidence from hospitalization events. Journal of Finance, 75(4), 1877-1911
CEO hospitalisation as variation in exposure to the CEO (Danish register data per the paper as generally described; not stated in the abstract). CEOs significantly affect profitability and investment, more so for younger CEOs and in growing, family-controlled and human-capital-intensive firms.
Sourcedoi:10.1111/jofi.12897230 citations (OpenAlex)
E4FT50
Becker, S. O., & Hvide, H. K. (2022)
Review of Finance, 26(1), 163-185
Deaths of nearly 1,500 entrepreneurs (Norwegian register data per the paper as generally described; not stated in the abstract). Large, sustained negative effects on growth and profitability; about 60% lower sales in larger start-ups. Effects reflect "entrepreneur specialness rather than leadership transition".
Sourcedoi:10.1093/rof/rfab01530 citations (OpenAlex)
E5FT50
Smith, M., Yagan, D., Zidar, O., & Zwick, E. (2019)
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 134(4), 1675-1745
US tax data linking 11 million firms to owners. Top pass-through profit accrues to working-age owners of closely held mid-market firms in skill-intensive industries, and profit falls by three-quarters after owner retirement or premature death. Strong US evidence that much of a private firm's profit is tied to the owner and may not transfer to a buyer.
Sourcedoi:10.1093/qje/qjz020261 citations (OpenAlex)
E6FT50
Bhandari, A., & McGrattan, E. R. (2021)
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 136(2), 727-781
Theory of sweat equity disciplined with US national accounts, business censuses and brokered sales. Sweat equity is valued at 1.2 times US GDP, and "for a typical owner, 26% of the sweat equity is transferable through inheritance or sale".
Sourcedoi:10.1093/qje/qjaa04171 citations (OpenAlex)
E7FT50
Wasserman, N. (2003)
Organization Science, 14(2), 149-172
Field research plus event-history analysis of 202 Internet firms. Product development completion and financing rounds trigger founder-CEO replacement; nearly all early-stage successions bring in outsiders. VC-backed setting.
Sourcedoi:10.1287/orsc.14.2.149.14995555 citations (OpenAlex)
E8FT50
Ewens, M., & Marx, M. (2018)
Review of Financial Studies, 31(4), 1532-1565
VC financings with hand-collected founder turnover; instruments replacement with changes in non-compete law in 14 US states, 1995 to 2016. Naive estimates are negative; instrumented estimates show replacement improves performance. (Abstract source: EconPapers/RePEc.)
Sourcedoi:10.1093/rfs/hhx130176 citations (OpenAlex)
E9FT50
Chen, J., & Thompson, P. (2015)
Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 9(3), 243-262
4,172 Danish start-ups. Replacement is driven by mismatch between business quality and founder ability and occurs among the worst and the best firms. Firms that replace the founder are much more likely to fail, but survivors grow considerably faster.
Sourcedoi:10.1002/sej.120339 citations (OpenAlex)
E10FT50
Cornelli, F., Kominek, Z., & Ljungqvist, A. (2013)
Journal of Finance, 68(2), 431-481
Detailed board data for a large sample of PE-backed firms. Soft information lets boards learn CEO ability and avoid firing for bad luck; establishes a causal link between forced CEO turnover and performance improvement.
Sourcedoi:10.1111/jofi.12004230 citations (OpenAlex)
E11FT50
Gao, H., Harford, J., & Li, K. (2017)
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 52(2), 583-611
Compares CEO turnover in public and large private firms. Private firms have lower turnover and lower turnover-performance sensitivity but larger post-turnover performance improvements.
Sourcedoi:10.1017/s0022109017000126132 citations (OpenAlex)
E12other
Caselli, F., & Gennaioli, N. (2013)
Economic Inquiry, 51(1), 971-996
Model in which untalented heirs running family firms reduce TFP, with incidence depending on contract enforcement. A macro rationale for a functioning market in firm ownership and control.
Sourcedoi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00467.x125 citations (OpenAlex)