D1FT50
Boucly, Q., Sraer, D., & Thesmar, D. (2011)
Journal of Financial Economics, 102(2), 432-453
839 French LBOs against matched controls. In the three years after a buyout, targets become more profitable, grow much faster, issue more debt and raise capital expenditure. Growth is concentrated in private-to-private deals "where the seller is an individual" and in industries dependent on external finance, consistent with PE relaxing credit constraints. The single most relevant finance result for owner-to-buyer SME transfers. (Abstract source: RePEc working-paper record in OpenAlex.)
Sourcedoi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.05.014235 citations (OpenAlex)
D2FT50
Bernstein, S., & Sheen, A. (2016)
Review of Financial Studies, 29(9), 2387-2418
Health inspection records for US restaurant chain buyouts. Store-level practices improve after buyout, more in directly owned stores than in franchised "twin" stores, and more when PE partners have industry experience. Operational improvement comes with industry expertise.
Sourcedoi:10.1093/rfs/hhw037216 citations (OpenAlex)
D3FT50
Davis, S. J., Haltiwanger, J., Handley, K., Jarmin, R., Lerner, J., & Miranda, J. (2014)
American Economic Review, 104(12), 3956-3990
3,200 US buyout targets and their 150,000 establishments, 1980 to 2005, with Census controls. Modest net job losses, large gross job reallocation, and TFP gains driven by exit of weak establishments and entry of productive ones.
Sourcedoi:10.1257/aer.104.12.3956344 citations (OpenAlex)
D4FT50
Cohn, J. B., Hotchkiss, E. S., & Towery, E. M. (2022)
Review of Finance, 26(2), 257-285
PE acquirers target private firms with weak profitability and firms with growth potential that are levered and finance-dependent. Targets grow rapidly after buyout, especially with add-on acquisitions; value comes from relaxing financing constraints and operating improvement, with a limited role for financial engineering. (US tax-return data per the paper as generally described; not stated in the abstract.)
Sourcedoi:10.1093/rof/rfac00578 citations (OpenAlex)
D5near-FT50
Bastié, F., Cieply, S., & Cussy, P. (2018)
Transfers to employees versus transfers to outsiders. Small Business Economics, 50(1), 77-89
French panel on new businesses in the mid-2000s. Transfers to employees last longer than transfers to outsiders; they grow turnover less but create more jobs. Grounded in information and agency theory. The outsider-buyer category here is the closest large-sample proxy for a self-funded searcher. (Abstract source: Springer page.)
Sourcedoi:10.1007/s11187-017-9903-517 citations (OpenAlex)
D6FT50
Robbie, K., & Wright, M. (1995)
Journal of Management Studies, 32(4), 527-549
Case evidence on buy-ins, where both management and ownership change. Managers may be well incentivised, but "problems may arise in respect of information asymmetries, difficulties in matching entrepreneurs to the context and monitoring by venture capitalists". This is the search fund problem stated in 1995.
Sourcedoi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.1995.tb00787.x67 citations (OpenAlex)
D7FT50
Wright, M., Robbie, K., Thompson, S., & Starkey, K. (1994)
Strategic Management Journal, 15(3), 215-227
UK quantitative and case evidence across the whole size range of buyouts. Supports a heterogeneity view: earlier exit is associated with larger buyouts, privatisations and divestments from foreign parents, and with stronger financing institutions.
Sourcedoi:10.1002/smj.425015030397 citations (OpenAlex)
D8FT50
Wright, M., Robbie, K., Romanet, Y., Thompson, S., Joachimsson, R., Bruining, J., & Herst, A. (1994)
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 18(2), 90-109
Four-country study (UK, France, Netherlands, Sweden) of the timing and nature of harvesting buyout and buy-in investments and the control devices used, including equity ratchets. (Abstract source: reprint chapter record in OpenAlex.)
Sourcedoi:10.1177/10422587940180020622 citations (OpenAlex)
D9near-FT50
Scholes, L., Wright, M., Westhead, P., & Bruining, H. (2010)
International Small Business Journal, 28(5), 505-521
Hand-collected sample of 104 PE-backed MBO/MBIs of former family firms across Europe. Greater scope for efficiency gains and growth where the founder was present at buyout and where no non-family managers held equity before.
Sourcedoi:10.1177/026624261037039072 citations (OpenAlex)
D10near-FT50
Bruining, H., Verwaal, E., & Wright, M. (2013)
Small Business Economics, 40(3), 591-605
Majority PE-backed buyouts significantly increase entrepreneurial management practices; leverage raises administrative management. Sample not described in the abstract.
Sourcedoi:10.1007/s11187-011-9386-854 citations (OpenAlex)
D11FT50
Meuleman, M., Amess, K., Wright, M., & Scholes, L. (2009)
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 33(1), 213-239
238 PE-backed UK buyouts, 1993 to 2003. Combines agency theory with a strategic entrepreneurship view that includes growth upside, and relates PE involvement to post-buyout performance by buyout type.
Sourcedoi:10.1111/j.1540-6520.2008.00287.x207 citations (OpenAlex)
D12near-FT50
Howorth, C., Wright, M., Westhead, P., & Allcock, D. (2016)
Small Business Economics, 47(3), 803-817
Six UK family firms that underwent an MBO or MBI in 1998, followed to 2014. Professionalisation occurs in waves triggered by ownership and management change, not as a one-off threshold.
Sourcedoi:10.1007/s11187-016-9761-667 citations (OpenAlex)
D13other
Chrisman, J. J., Chua, J. H., Steier, L. P., Wright, M., & McKee, D. N. (2012)
Journal of Family Business Strategy, 3(4), 197-206
Conceptual: value creation in MBOs of family firms depends on pre-MBO agency costs, solving the "double agency problem", and the cost of control mechanisms before and after. (Abstract source: EconPapers/RePEc.)
Sourcedoi:10.1016/j.jfbs.2012.10.00350 citations (OpenAlex)
D14other
Schickinger, A., Leitterstorf, M. P., & Kammerlander, N. (2018)
Journal of Family Business Strategy, 9(4), 268-292
Reviews 50 studies (1990 to 2017) on PE and family firms across management, finance and economics, with a three-phase framework and a research agenda. (Abstract source: Semantic Scholar.)
Sourcedoi:10.1016/j.jfbs.2018.09.00241 citations (OpenAlex)
D15near-FT50
Cepec, J., & Grajzl, P. (2021)
Small Business Economics, 57(1), 555-581
Slovenian small firms in bankruptcy reorganisation. Changes before completed proceedings never reduce liquidation risk; only post-proceeding changes that involve ownership transfer to domestic incoming owners reduce it. Consistent with "disruption costs" of turnover. (Abstract source: Springer page.)
Sourcedoi:10.1007/s11187-020-00325-z14 citations (OpenAlex)