A quality of earnings report can be professionally done, directionally correct, and still overstate the earnings you are buying. Not because anyone lied, but because a QoE answers a narrow question: did the reported profit happen? It does not always ask whether the adjustments are realistic, whether the growth is the company's own, whether the claims about the future hold up, or whether cash is leaving before you arrive. The overlay method is how you ask those four questions yourself, on top of whatever earnings figure you have been handed. It is the advanced extension of the add-back tiers in lesson 6.2.1.
Principle
An overlay is an adjustment you layer on top of an earnings figure that has already been adjusted, for something that figure did not price. Overlay-adjusted EBITDA is the seller's or the QoE's adjusted EBITDA after your overlays. It is the number you underwrite.
Why you need it: a QoE (quality of earnings report, an accounting firm's independent test of reported profit) starts from the company's reported earnings and tests them. That is valuable, and lesson 6.3.2 covers when to buy one. But reported earnings are a strong anchor even for professionals. A study of expert valuations of private firms found heavy reliance on the firms' reported earnings, despite the possibility of manipulation (C23, 2010). The overlays push past the anchor.
There are four, and each has a rule:
- Challenge the replacement compensation. An add-back is only as good as the replacement salary subtracted from it. If the assumed cost of replacing the owner or executives is unrealistic, the add-back is overstated by the difference, every year, times the multiple.
- Strip the pass-through revenue. Growth that arrives as someone else's work at no margin is borrowed, not earned. Pass-through revenue is money the company bills a customer for subcontractors, equipment or materials it buys and passes along at little or no markup. In government contracting it is often called ODC, other direct costs. It inflates revenue and growth while barely moving profit. Remove it, and what remains is organic growth: the growth of the company's own work.
- Verify every claimed rate against outside data. Never accept a win rate, renewal rate or retention rate you did not compute yourself. These rates are how a seller turns the past into a story about the future, and they are rarely footnoted.
- Watch pre-close working capital to the last day. Earnings you buy are worth less if the cash that runs the business leaves before you arrive. Working capital is the money tied up in running the business day to day: receivables and inventory, minus bills owed. A seller can pull cash out through distributions, slow payables or fast collections in the months before close.
Every overlay goes through the multiple. Illustrative arithmetic: if a replacement salary is understated by $100,000, then at 4.7 times earnings that one assumption carries $470,000 of price. On a self-funded deal, that is debt you sign for personally.
Case
Project Marlin (real, anonymized)
Project Marlin was a cleared government-services company: classified communications and cleared IT support, more than two hundred cleared employees, programs in about half a dozen countries. Roughly $25 to $30 million of revenue, about $3.5 million of adjusted EBITDA, backlog around $90 million, a clean balance sheet with no debt, priced in the mid-teens of millions at a headline multiple around 4.7 times. A real business with a real moat. It is larger than most self-funded deals, which is the point: even at this size, with a professional QoE in hand, the overlays changed the answer.
The QoE was professionally done and directionally correct. It was also overstated by several hundred thousand dollars. Each overlay found part of it:
- Replacement compensation. Roughly half a million dollars of executive compensation was added back against an assumed replacement salary barely above $225,000. Nobody runs a company of that revenue, with two hundred employees across several countries, at that salary. Re-run the add-back at a realistic number and adjusted EBITDA shrinks immediately.
- Pass-through. Gross margin compressed from roughly 47 percent to 39 percent over the measurement period, because pass-through subcontractor costs grew more than fourfold. The headline growth rate was 38 percent. With pass-through revenue stripped out, organic growth was 15 to 20 percent. The company was growing, just at about half the claimed speed.
- Claimed rates. The deck claimed a 90 percent success rate on recompetes, the re-bids for contracts coming up for renewal. Public award data showed an overall win rate under 50 percent. The overlay is not that the company was bad at winning. It is that the projection was built on a rate the record did not support.
- Working capital. Owner distributions accelerated sharply in the months before close, and the cash balance dropped by about 40 percent in six months. The working-capital peg (the level of working capital the seller must leave in the business at closing, with the price adjusted for any shortfall) exists for exactly this.
The same review surfaced concentration (the top five contracts were about three quarters of backlog, two of them subcontracts the company did not control) and a cybersecurity-compliance remediation bill the QoE did not mention. Layered together, the overlays took the 4.7 times headline to roughly 5.5 to 6.9 times effective. Same company, same asking price. Lesson 6.4.2 works that effective-multiple math in full. The rule from this case: price the overlay, not the ask.
Coastal Comfort HVAC (fictional)
The same four overlays, run on the fictional company that runs through this curriculum:
- Replacement compensation. The broker added back the owner's full $90,000 salary with no replacement cost. A market general manager costs about $225,000 in salary, bonus and payroll taxes. Net overlay: -$135,000.
- Pass-through and one-time growth. Revenue grew 25 percent, from $5,325,000 to $6,675,000. Commercial and new-construction revenue alone went from $265,000 to $1,200,000, driven by one $930,000 job, the Harbor Pointe townhome project. Strip that job and FY2025 revenue is about $5,745,000, growth of about 8 percent. Strip the roughly $300,000 of pulled-forward residential replacements as well and growth is about 2 percent. In diligence, the 2026 year-to-date run rate tracked the FY2024 baseline plus about 6 percent. The organic rate was single digits. The headline was 25.
- Claimed rates. The broker's memo leans on "800-plus recurring maintenance agreements" and a homebuilder that "continues to refer new work." Diligence confirmed about 810 agreements, 9 percent of them multi-year prepayments at a promotional discount, and found no written agreement with the homebuilder at all. The way to test a renewal claim is to compare last year's agreement list to this year's, customer by customer, and compute the rate yourself.
- Working capital. The owner took $810,000 in distributions in FY2025. The balance sheet carries $57,000 of deferred revenue from prepaid maintenance, service you will owe after closing with cash the seller has already collected. In the fictional diligence, the deferred-revenue component of the peg was adjusted by $21,000 for the multi-year prepays.
Steps
1. Start from the best number you have
Use the most rigorous adjusted EBITDA available: the QoE's if one exists, otherwise your own bridge from lesson 6.2.1. Write it at the top of a page. Every overlay below is a line under it.
2. Overlay 1: re-price the replacement compensation
- Find every add-back for owner, family or executive pay, and the replacement cost subtracted against it.
- List each role the departing person performs.
- Price those roles at market for the company's size, industry and region, using sources you can show a lender: job postings, local wage data, recruiter quotes.
- If your replacement cost is higher than the one assumed, the difference is a negative overlay. Write it down with its source.
3. Overlay 2: strip the pass-through
- Ask for revenue by type for three years: the company's own labor and services, and anything billed through at cost or near cost (subcontractors, equipment resale, materials, travel).
- Calculate gross margin by year. A falling margin alongside rising revenue is the signature of pass-through growth.
- Remove pass-through revenue and its matching cost, and recompute growth on what remains. That is organic growth.
- Remove one-time jobs the same way. Value the business on the organic base, not the headline.
4. Overlay 3: verify every claimed rate
- List every rate in the marketing package: win rate, renewal rate, retention rate, close rate, repeat-customer rate.
- For each, identify the records that would let you compute it: the list of contracts or agreements up for renewal and which were kept, public award records, customer lists by year.
- Compute it yourself. Where your rate is lower, rebuild any projection or backlog value that relies on it.
- A rate the seller cannot support with records is a projection, and projections are Tier C. Under SBA SOP 50 10 8.1, effective October 1, 2026 (Y25), the lender's coverage test runs on historical earnings, not projections, so an unsupported rate should not reach your earnings number at all.
5. Overlay 4: watch working capital to the last day
- Get monthly balance sheets or, at minimum, monthly bank statements for the trailing year, and keep requesting them through the closing date.
- Track cash, receivables, payables, deferred revenue and owner distributions month by month.
- Calculate the trailing-twelve-month average working capital. That average is the usual starting point for the peg.
- Write the peg into your letter of intent as a formula, not a fixed number, so that deferred revenue and prepaid work are counted.
- If cash falls sharply or distributions accelerate before close, raise it in writing immediately and true it up through the peg.
6. Total the overlays and run the multiple
Subtract the overlays from your starting figure to get overlay-adjusted EBITDA. Divide the asking price by it to get the effective multiple. Compare it to the headline multiple, and carry both into lesson 6.4.2.
7. Decide what structure can carry and what it cannot
Some overlays point to uncertainty rather than a fixed loss: a relationship with no contract, a renewal rate you could only partly verify. Research on private-firm acquisitions found that seller financing becomes more common as information asymmetry between buyer and seller rises (C24, 2020). In a self-funded deal, a larger seller note is how you ask the seller to share the risk their story created. One constraint: under SOP 50 10 8.1, seller earnouts are prohibited in SBA 7(a) acquisitions. The one contingent tool the SOP names is a buyer rebate based on business performance, and any rebate the borrower receives must be applied to pay down the principal of the 7(a) loan. Coastal Comfort uses no contingent price at all. Its uncertainty is carried by two seller notes, one of them on full standby (no payments of principal or interest for the term of the SBA loan), which lessons 6.5.2 and 7.5.2 explain. Overlays that are certain losses belong in the price, not the structure.
Deliverable
An Overlay Worksheet for the deal, with:
- The starting adjusted EBITDA and its source (QoE or your own bridge).
- Four overlay sections, each with the evidence, the dollar adjustment and the source document: replacement compensation, pass-through and one-time revenue stripped (with organic growth stated beside headline growth), claimed rates against your computed rates, and the monthly working-capital track with your proposed peg formula.
- Overlay-adjusted EBITDA, the effective multiple at the asking price, and the headline multiple beside it.
- A short list of which overlays you will take to price and which you will handle through structure, and why.
This lesson is education, not accounting, tax or legal advice. A licensed CPA should review the financials of any business you intend to buy.