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Library/Information asymmetry, pricing, valuation and deal process

C24FT50Open

Resolving information asymmetry through contractual risk sharing: The case of private firm acquisitions

Jansen, M (2020)

Journal of Accounting Research, 58(5), 1203-1248

When private firms are acquired, buyers commonly rely on seller financing and earnouts. Using a novel database of private acquisitions, I find that seller financing and earnouts become more common as information asymmetry increases between the acquirer and the target. Financial statement audits of the targets attenuate these results, which suggests that audits decrease information asymmetry in firm acquisitions. Seller‐financed acquisitions also close faster and at higher prices, reducing the private firm discount. These findings suggest that these contract structures are an important channel through which privately held firms mitigate adverse selection that arises from information asymmetry.

Sourcedoi:10.1111/1475-679x.1233549 citations (OpenAlex)

Full citation

Jansen, M. (2020). Resolving information asymmetry through contractual risk sharing: The case of private firm acquisitions. Journal of Accounting Research, 58(5), 1203-1248.

https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12335

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