Skip to content
CurriculumToolsLibraryCommunitySign in
Join the community

Curriculum/Part VI: Underwrite/Buy Growth or Buy Cash Flow

Lesson 6.7.1

Two Different Purchases

The growth-acquisition and leveraged-buyout frameworks side by side: when thin recurring revenue, key-person risk or a regulatory cliff forces an equity-heavy structure, how to size a niche market, and how to read an unrepresented founder's anchor.

Lesson 12 of 12 in this part · 12 minute read · Draft, under review

Short answer

How do I tell whether a business is a leveraged buyout candidate or a growth acquisition?

Test whether recurring cash flow alone, in your bear case, still covers the proposed debt at 1.10x or better, the floor this textbook uses for a bad year. Then check how much revenue and capability leaves with the founder or one key employee, and whether a date-certain event threatens the business. If coverage passes and the other two are manageable, it is a leveraged buyout. If not, it is a growth purchase that needs equity-heavy money.

Before you ask what a business is worth, ask what kind of purchase it is. Some businesses are bought for the cash they already produce: you borrow against that cash, pay the loan down, and own what is left. Others are bought for what they could become: the value is in a growth story, and the money has to be patient enough to wait for it. These are two different purchases with two different capital structures, and most of the expensive mistakes in this part of the curriculum come from buying the second kind with the first kind of money. This lesson teaches the sorting question, using one fictional case and one real one, anonymized.

Principle

A leveraged buyout buys cash flow. A growth acquisition buys a future. Price and finance each one for what it is.

Leveraged buyout Growth acquisition
Where returns come from Paying down debt out of stable cash flow Scaling the business's top line
Capital structure Debt-heavy Equity-heavy, released in stages as milestones are met
The founder Leaves Keeps a stake and stays
What kills you A down year against fixed loan payments The growth not showing up

The self-funded buyer is an LBO buyer by construction

You do not get to choose freely between those columns. The money available to a self-funded buyer chooses for you. Under SOP 50 10 8.1, effective October 1, 2026 (Y25), an SBA 7(a) acquisition loan:

  • must show 1.25x debt service coverage on historical earnings for an initial acquisition, measured "using either the last fiscal year-end or an average of the last two fiscal year-end statements on either a historical or adjusted basis". Projections do not count.
  • requires a 10 percent equity injection that cannot be reduced for an initial acquisition. (From Veterans Day 2026 through fiscal year 2027, an eligible veteran may raise all of it from permitted outside sources rather than at most half (Y29); the terms are in SBA Procedural Notice 5000-883564, so confirm with your lender that you qualify. The injection itself does not shrink.)
  • does not allow the seller to stay on as an owner, officer, director or employee after a 100 percent purchase. A paid consulting arrangement of up to 24 months is the limit. (A partial change of ownership is different. When an outside buyer takes 50 percent or more, the technical updates effective October 1, 2026 apply the Initial Acquisition credit standards, and "sellers retain their ability to remain as an owner and employee of the business as allowed under an Owner Buyout". Lesson 7.4.3 covers it.)
  • prohibits seller earnouts. The only contingent tool the SOP names is a buyer rebate based on business performance, and any rebate the borrower receives must be applied to pay down the principal of the 7(a) loan.

Read those four rules together and the conclusion is plain. The SBA can only lend against cash flow that already exists. It will not finance a growth story, it will not let the founder keep a stake in a business you buy outright, and it will not let you pay for the story through an earnout. If the price only works on the growth, the SBA cannot finance it, and you should not personally guarantee it.

That does not mean you give up growth. A study of 839 French leveraged buyouts found that targets grew much faster than matched companies in the three years after the deal, especially when a private company was bought from an individual owner, consistent with the buyer relaxing credit limits the founder had lived under (D1, 2011). Buying cash flow and growing afterward is a normal outcome. Pay for the cash flow. Own the growth. Growth is the upside you did not pay for, not the justification for the price.

Recurring revenue is a debt-service tool, not a return guarantee

Recurring revenue is the first thing buyers look for, and it deserves a precise role. A 2025 Yale study of 59 exited traditional search fund companies from one investor found no statistically reliable relationship between the share of recurring revenue at acquisition and later returns, but did find that higher recurring revenue went with higher entry multiples (M5, 2025). That is traditional search, a single investor's portfolio, and the authors flag those limits. The useful reading for you is narrow: recurring revenue is something you pay for, not something that pays you automatically.

For a self-funded buyer, recurring revenue does a different and more important job. It is what makes the loan payment in the bad year. So the question is never "how much of the revenue is recurring?" It is "can the recurring cash flow alone, after a bad year, still cover the debt with a cushion?" This curriculum sets that cushion at 1.10x in the bear case, the same floor as lesson 6.5.2, and treats anything under 1.0x as a stop. The lender's 1.25x is a separate test, run on historical earnings.

Three conditions that force an equity-heavy structure

When any of these shows up, the business is not a candidate for a debt-heavy purchase, at least not at a price the seller will accept:

  1. Thin recurring revenue. The revenue that repeats on its own is too small to carry the loan, and the rest arrives in lumps.
  2. Key-person risk. One person, often the founder or one technical employee, is effectively the product. If they leave, the asset goes with them.
  3. A regulatory cliff. A license, certification, contract vehicle or rule with a hard date, after which the business's advantage may disappear.

Case

Coastal Comfort HVAC: a cash-flow purchase

Coastal Comfort is the fictional company that runs through this curriculum. It is a clean LBO candidate once you price it correctly. About 810 active maintenance plans and a steady service business produce roughly $1,017,000 of recurring adjusted EBITDA, a figure that already excludes the one-time job and the pulled-forward replacements. On the letter-of-intent structure (lesson 6.5.2), that number covers the debt at about 1.72x, and the bear case, with EBITDA down to about $680,000, still covers it at about 1.15x. That clears the 1.10x floor, so the first sorting test passes. The growth story, the Beachline homebuilder channel that produced a record FY2025, is real but fragile, so the buyer did not pay for it at all. The $3,800,000 letter-of-intent price is built on recurring earnings without the spike. When the quality of earnings report later moves recurring EBITDA to about $920,000, the test is run again on the closing structure: 1.75x on the lender's test and 1.11x in a bear case of about $583,000, a pass by a hair. The deal closes at $3,500,000, and $500,000 of it waits in a seller note on full standby behind the SBA loan. Cash flow priced as cash flow; growth left as upside the buyer did not pay for.

Project Ridgeline: a growth purchase in LBO clothing

Project Ridgeline is an anonymized live deal from this school's case files. It is much larger than a typical self-funded deal, and it was never a candidate for SBA financing, which is exactly why it is useful: it shows the other column clearly.

The company is a niche defense-software business with a certification moat. Its product encrypts stored data, and its real asset is a federal cryptographic validation that competitors do not have and cannot quickly get. Roughly $12 to $15 million in revenue, run by fewer than ten people. On paper, about $3.5 million of trailing EBITDA.

On paper. Only about $2 million of the revenue is genuinely recurring, in annual per-device license fees. The rest is upfront perpetual-license revenue that arrives in lumps whenever a customer refreshes hardware. That one fact decides the purchase. Lumpy license revenue cannot carry senior debt; one slow refresh cycle and the debt eats you.

Then the other two conditions arrived. One technical employee was effectively the product's spine. And the core validation was scheduled to go historical on a hard federal date, with no successor module yet in the certification queue and a competitor reportedly in the market. Thin recurring revenue, key-person risk and a regulatory clock: all three conditions at once. The conclusion was not a lower price. It was a different purchase: equity-heavy, with heavy founder rollover, or no purchase at all.

Reading an unrepresented founder's anchor

The founder was running his own process, without a banker, after a bank passed on the mandate. His asking price was several times any defensible value, and the way he built it is worth studying:

  • He anchored on a revenue multiple, not earnings. Revenue multiples run higher and hide a lumpy cost structure. He never volunteered an EBITDA figure.
  • He narrowed the revenue projection to make the anchor look conservative. "I'm only assuming modest growth" is a framing move, not a concession, when the multiple on that revenue is doing all the work.
  • He wanted growth-equity pricing with buyout liquidity. A full cash exit at a price that assumed the growth the buyer's capital and effort would create. He was asking to be paid for a future he was not staying to help build.

The structure that fit, and how it ended

The honest structure had four parts: an enterprise-value ceiling set by what the recurring revenue alone supports; 30 to 40 percent founder rollover so the growth story keeps its author; milestone payments and holdbacks tied to the recertification and the pipeline; and a hard line on price. That structure, including milestone payments, lives outside SBA financing. Inside a 7(a) deal, under SOP 50 10 8.1, earnouts are prohibited, and in a 100 percent purchase the seller cannot stay on as an owner.

No letter of intent was signed. The pursuit settled into a disciplined slow-play: stay close, hold the line on price, and let the clock do the arguing. A seller who declines a structure that pays him for his own projections is telling you what he really believes about them. That answer cost nothing, and it is the most useful diligence finding in the file.

Steps

1. Ask the sorting question first

Before you calculate a multiple, answer in writing: which of the two purchases is this? Run three tests:

  1. Coverage on recurring cash flow alone. Strip out every lump: one-time projects, perpetual licenses, pulled-forward demand. Apply your bear case. Does what remains cover the proposed debt at 1.10x or better? Below 1.0x is a stop. This is your stress test, not the lender's: the lender tests 1.25x on the last fiscal year or the average of the last two, and a bear case is a projection.
  2. Key-person check. If the founder and your single most important employee left on day one, what fraction of revenue and capability walks out with them?
  3. The clock. Is there a date-certain external event: a lease end, a contract recompete, a certification expiry, a rule change, a retirement? Who does it pressure more, the buyer or the seller?

If the first test passes and the other two are manageable, it is an LBO, and lessons 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 apply. If the first test fails, or the second and third both bite, it is a growth purchase. As a first-time self-funded buyer with a personal guarantee, your default answer to a growth purchase is to pass, or to find out whether the seller will accept a structure that carries the risk with him.

2. Size the niche in concentric rings

Niche businesses often have no published market size, and sellers fill the gap with a large, flattering number. Build your own from the bottom up, in three rings:

  • Ring 1, the core. Customers who must buy what this business sells, today, that you can name and count. For a certified product, that is the set of buyers whose rules require the certification. For an HVAC company, it is the households and buildings inside the service radius.
  • Ring 2, the adjacent. Customers who could buy with a modest change: a new region, a new product line, a buyer category one step away.
  • Ring 3, the theoretical. Everyone the seller's pitch deck says could buy.

Size each ring as count of customers times units per customer times price per unit, using public sources: permit and licensing records, government contract data, trade association member lists. As illustrative arithmetic only: 400 required buyers, each running 50 devices at $100 a device a year, is a $2,000,000 core ring. Only Ring 1 supports the price you pay with debt. Ring 2 supports a growth thesis, financed with equity or contingent consideration. Ring 3 supports nothing.

3. Convert the anchor into multiples

When a seller gives you a price, translate it into every multiple a lender or investor would underwrite, and put them side by side. Using the fictional Coastal Comfort ask of $6,450,000:

Measure Figure Implied multiple of the ask
Broker's adjusted EBITDA $1,710,000 3.8x
Recurring adjusted EBITDA $1,017,000 6.3x
FY2025 revenue $6,675,000 about 1.0x

The seller advertises the first row. A lender underwrites something close to the second. You never have to say "your price is unreasonable." You say: "Help me understand which of these numbers a lender would underwrite." If the arithmetic embarrasses the ask, let the arithmetic negotiate. Lesson 7.2.1 goes deeper on reading seller intent.

4. Name the contradiction early, and politely

If the seller wants a growth price and a full cash exit, say so in plain terms: the price assumes growth that the buyer's money and effort will create after the seller leaves. Then offer the structure that resolves it. Outside SBA financing, that is cash for today's recurring cash flow and payment for the growth when it arrives. Inside an SBA deal you cannot pay for growth when it arrives, because earnouts are prohibited (SOP 50 10 8.1). You pay only for the recurring cash flow, defer part of that price into seller notes behind the bank, and keep the growth as your upside. The one performance-based tool the SOP names is a buyer rebate, which must be applied to pay down the loan.

5. Match the structure to the purchase

  • Cash-flow purchase: SBA 7(a) senior debt, a seller note, the 10 percent injection, and a walk-away price from your bear case.
  • Growth purchase: equity-heavy, milestone-gated money, a founder who keeps a meaningful stake, and contingent payments tied to named events. That is a different capital raise, usually outside SBA financing, and it needs securities and deal counsel. Lessons 7.4.1 and 7.5.4 cover what is permitted.

6. Know when "buy at-bats, not EBITDA" applies

An HVAC operator interviewed on the Still Searching podcast described how, after rebuilding his company around his own sales metrics, he stopped buying a target's earnings and started buying its traffic: its customer list and the calls coming in, which he could run through his own sales process. He was explicit about the condition: it applies only once you have your own playbook and your own numbers, and it does not apply when you are getting started.

That is the right reading for a first-time buyer. On your first deal, buy EBITDA. You do not yet have the operating numbers that let you value someone else's customers above their history. "At-bats" thinking is an add-on strategy for an owner with a proven system, not a reason to pay a growth price for your first company.

Deliverable

A one-page "Which purchase is this?" memo for your deal, with:

  • The coverage test: recurring cash flow alone, in your bear case, against the proposed debt, with the 1.10x floor marked.
  • The key-person finding and the clock, each with who it pressures more.
  • A three-ring market sizing table, bottom-up, with sources named.
  • The seller's anchor converted into multiples of claimed EBITDA, recurring EBITDA and revenue.
  • A classification, cash-flow purchase or growth purchase, and the structure that fits it, or the word walk.

If the memo says growth purchase, the walk-away price from lesson 6.5.2 is not the end of the analysis. It is the price of the cash flow, and anything above it has to be paid by the future, not by you.

This lesson is education, not investment, lending, securities, tax or legal advice. Coastal Comfort is fictional and Project Ridgeline is anonymized; its figures are deliberately rounded. A deal attorney should review any structure that defers or conditions part of the price.

Common questions

Asked about this lesson

Can you use an SBA loan to buy a business for its growth potential?

No. Under SBA SOP 50 10 8.1, effective October 1, 2026, a 7(a) acquisition loan must show 1.25x debt service coverage on historical earnings, and projections do not count. Earnouts are prohibited, and in a 100 percent purchase the seller cannot keep a stake. If the price only works on the growth, the SBA cannot finance it.

Does recurring revenue make a business a better acquisition?

Its real job for a self-funded buyer is making the loan payment in a bad year. A 2025 Yale study of 59 exited traditional search fund companies from one investor found no statistically reliable link between recurring revenue share and later returns, but higher recurring revenue went with higher entry multiples. It is something you pay for.

How do you estimate market size for a niche business?

Build it from the bottom up in three rings: core customers who must buy today, adjacent customers reachable with a modest change, and the theoretical market in the seller's pitch. Size each ring as customers times units times price, using public sources. Only the core ring supports a price paid with debt.

How do you respond to a seller's unrealistic asking price?

Convert the ask into every multiple a lender or investor would underwrite: claimed EBITDA, recurring EBITDA and revenue, side by side. Then ask the seller which of those numbers a lender would underwrite. You never have to call the price unreasonable. Let the arithmetic negotiate.

More answers on the buyer FAQ.

Sources

From the Library

  1. M5

    Daniel Lazier, Jacob Thomas, A. J. Wasserstein. (2025). Does Recurring Revenue Really Drive Financial Outcomes in Search Fund-Acquired Businesses?. Yale Case, no number printed, September 23, 2025.

  2. D1

    Boucly, Q., Sraer, D., & Thesmar, D. (2011). Growth LBOs. Journal of Financial Economics, 102(2), 432-453.

  3. Y25

    U.S. Small Business Administration (2026). SOP 50 10 8.1, Lender and Development Company Loan Programs, with Technical Policy Updates. Effective October 1, 2026.

  4. Y29

    U.S. Small Business Administration (2026). SBA Establishes New 7(a) Equity Flexibility for Veterans' Small Business Acquisitions. News release 26-117, November 9, 2026.

You have read Part VI

Now put it to work.

Step 2

Play chapter 6: Underwrite: the number, the letter and the report

The Monday after the screen. Prove the earnings line by line, test the margin, work out your walk-away, write the letter, and carry it through the quality of earnings report. Whether the deal survives the report depends on what you built before it.

Step 3

Practise: the assignment

One assignment for this part, posted in the community where other buyers check your work.