Every person in a business sale is paid by someone, and each of them wants the deal to close. That is not a scandal. It is how the work is structured. But it means the process around you is not a safeguard by itself, and the danger is greatest when the person running the process also has a stake in the outcome. This lesson follows a business broker who listed a company, then bought it, and discovered after closing that the profit he had pitched to other buyers was billing fraud.
Principle
When the person running the process has a stake in the outcome, the process is not a safeguard. Map who is paid by whom, and what each person gains if you sign.
Start with the broker. A business broker is an intermediary who markets a company and manages the sale, and brokers are typically paid by the seller, usually as a commission on the price (JA98, 2011). Research on intermediaries in small business transfers frames their role through agency theory, the study of what happens when the person acting for you has interests of their own, and examines how intermediaries manage risk and uncertainty between buyer and seller (C42, 2015). The rest of your team is paid by someone too: the lender when the loan closes, the attorney by the hour, the accountant by the engagement.
Do not assume a professional on the file has removed the risk of being lied to. A study of 899 acquisitions of private German, Belgian and Dutch firms found that advisory services from accountants, bankers, brokers, tax advisers and lawyers did not reduce obstacles such as misinformation during or immediately after the deal (U8, 2014). Another study found that experts valuing private firms relied heavily on the firms' reported earnings, despite the possibility that those earnings had been manipulated (C23, 2010).
Two rules carry this case:
- A discount is not diligence. Lowering the price for a problem you found does not tell you whether the business works. Only tracing the money does.
- A lie is a verdict on a person, not a pricing problem. Reprice a fixable problem. Walk away from a dishonest seller. The person comes with the deal, often as your creditor, your trainer or your partner.
The SBA builds a version of the first principle into its own rules. Under SBA SOP 50 10 8.1, effective October 1, 2026 (Y25), a loan referral agent may be paid by the borrower or by the lender, but not both, and every agent's fees must be disclosed on SBA Form 159. Apply the same rule to your own deal team: nobody you rely on for the truth should be paid by both sides.
Case
The case comes from Buyer Beware, chapter 5, "The $600 Tire." Names are the book's pseudonyms.
Tom Brennan was a business broker in Cincinnati, with two small companies of his own behind him and a law degree. He wanted an investment a manager would run. After two deals died in diligence, he told himself he would not let a third fall apart.
The third was his own listing: TriState Fleet Tire, a roadside truck-tire service near Louisville. Revenue had been about $1.5 million with its shop open and about $1 million from roadside work alone, with more than $800,000 flowing through one national tire brand's fleet program. The seller, Dianne, valued it at $6 million on her own spreadsheet; real offers came in between $2 million and $2.2 million. Tom cleared it with his firm, matched the top offer and added $50,000. As he later put it, when you are trying to sell something, you start believing in what you are trying to sell.
He did one big thing right: he bought a quality of earnings study. It found that the earnings on Dianne's tax return, a little over $600,000 a year, were about twice what the business really earned, because the brand's payments passed through a wholesaler that netted out tire costs she had never counted. The most official document the seller had produced was wrong.
Tom treated it as a price problem. He re-offered at $1 million, with Dianne keeping 20 percent and training the manager for ninety days at $10,000 a month. After crediting his own commission, he paid $951,000, borrowed against his stock portfolio rather than through a bank. The margins still made no sense, near 60 percent claimed, and Dianne's explanation was that you can mark the tire up to whatever you want. The accountant said the deal looked pretty safe at the new numbers. His wife disliked the seller after one phone call. The closing attorney told him plainly not to go into business with her. He signed.
After closing, Dianne drained the receivables, an undisclosed thirty-day hold surfaced, revenue fell about 40 percent in the first month, and she skipped her share of a cash call. Covering the phones while the manager was on vacation, Tom wrote up a call and walked into the back. The racks held cheap import tires costing about $230. The invoices billed the brand for its own premium tire at about $600. The program reimbursed tires at cost plus labor and small fees. There was no tire markup in this business. The fat margin was the fraud, on roughly seven of every ten brand calls.
On a recorded call, Dianne told him to keep billing imports under the brand's name. Tom stopped. The shop became a break-even labor business. He sued; she countersued. By the book's count he is about $1.2 million in, for a business perhaps worth $250,000, and the case continues. The fraud, had he kept it running, would have paid him about $150,000 a year. He chose not to.
Steps
These are the checks that would have caught it. Do the first three before you sign an LOI.
1. Draw the incentive map
For every person on the deal, write down who pays them, when, and what they earn if it closes:
| Person | Paid by | Paid when | Gains if you close | Gains if you walk |
|---|
Include yourself. Months of searching, two dead deals and a vow not to lose a third are an incentive too. If anyone on the map is on both sides, as Tom was, hand the diligence to someone who is not, and give them the authority to kill the deal.
2. Trace one sale from the phone call to the bank deposit
Not the story. The machine. Pick a real transaction and follow it in documents:
- The customer request or order.
- The work order and what was actually used or delivered.
- The invoice, and who it went to.
- The payment, and which account it landed in, net of what.
Do it for several transactions in each revenue stream. Where revenue runs through a third-party program, get the program contract and its reimbursement rules from the program, not the seller, and read what it pays for. One traced tire would have shown Tom that markup was impossible.
3. Reconcile units, not just dollars
For any business that resells physical goods, compare units purchased with units billed, by product, for twelve months:
- Purchases by item from supplier invoices.
- Sales by item from customer invoices.
- Physical stock on hand.
If the company bills far more premium units than it ever bought, the difference is not a rounding error. Do the same plausibility test on margin: if the claimed margin is higher than the program or market allows, someone is being billed for something that did not happen.
4. Treat a false tax return as an integrity finding
When a QoE or your own work shows the seller's tax return, P&L or add-back schedule is materially wrong, ask why in writing before you discuss price. An honest error has an honest explanation and supporting documents. If the explanation does not hold, the Walk-Away Doctrine applies: the financials did not survive scrutiny, and the person who produced them comes with the deal.
5. Do not partner with a seller whose numbers proved false
- Keep the seller's post-closing role minimal and written: where, how often, in what form, and with what remedy if it does not happen. Soft words in a contract are decisions handed to the other side.
- Be wary of seller rollover equity. In an SBA deal where you buy 100 percent, it is unavailable: under SOP 50 10 8.1, in an Initial Acquisition the seller may not remain an officer, director, stockholder or employee, and may stay only as a consultant for up to 24 months in total. A partial change of ownership is different. When an outside buyer takes 50 percent or more, the SOP applies the Initial Acquisition credit standards, but the sellers "retain their ability to remain as an owner and employee of the business as allowed under an Owner Buyout." Tom's deal was not SBA-financed, so no rule stood in the way. Wherever a seller keeps 20 percent, the seller keeps a seat at your table and standing to sue you.
- Specify receivables, holds and cash at closing in the purchase agreement, so nothing can be swept out the week before.
6. Count the yellow flags
Tom's rule now: more than three yellow flags is a red one. He had margins nobody could explain, a seller he disliked, a spouse who winced at one call, and a closing attorney who warned him to his face. Write each flag down as it appears, with the date. When the list hits four, stop and decide on the list, not on the momentum.
Deliverable
A two-part Incentive and Trace Worksheet:
- Part A: the incentive map from step 1, with any two-sided role flagged and reassigned.
- Part B: three traced transactions per revenue stream, from request to deposit, with the program or contract rule each one depends on, plus the twelve-month unit reconciliation.
Add your running yellow-flag log at the bottom, dated. If any trace breaks, the deal is paused until it is explained by documents, not by the seller.
This lesson is education, not legal or accounting advice. Have a licensed attorney and a CPA review any deal where a party has a conflict of interest or the financials have proven inaccurate.