Some businesses set their own prices. Many do not. An insurer, a government program, a platform, a franchisor or one dominant customer decides what the company gets paid, and can change it without asking. This lesson follows a buyer who fixed everything the deal had hidden from him, got profit back to plan, and then lost a large share of his earnings overnight when a stranger rewrote a price list. Your job is to find that lever before you close, and to size your debt as if it will move.
Principle
Before the accountants and before the lawyers, ask who sets the price of what this company sells. If the answer is not "the company does," slow down.
Some plain definitions first:
- Price-setter: whoever decides what the company is paid for a unit of what it sells. It can be the company, a competitive market, a contract counterparty, or a third party with the power to publish a rate.
- Reimbursement: in healthcare and similar fields, the amount a payer (an insurer or government program) pays for a service, often taken from a published fee schedule rather than negotiated.
- DSCR (debt service coverage ratio): cash flow available for debt payments divided by the debt payments due. A DSCR of 1.5 means $1.50 of cash flow for every $1.00 owed. Lenders set minimums, and your survival depends on the margin above them.
Either of two facts is survivable on its own: heavy debt, or a price someone else controls. Together they tie your survival to a list a stranger can rewrite. Every borrowed dollar is a bet that margins hold. When a third party can cut your price, it holds a kill switch over your company, and it will never know your name.
This risk is not peculiar to one deal. A 2026 IESE note on why search funds fail lists government involvement alongside customer concentration and sudden market change as a cause of failure, with remedies that start with risk assessment in diligence (L15). That is traditional search fund research, but the mechanism is the same for a self-funded buyer, who carries it with a personal guarantee.
Be careful with a sector's reputation. A field that has produced good outcomes for other buyers says nothing about who sets the price in the company in front of you. An attractive sector is not a pricing-power answer.
Case
The case comes from Buyer Beware, chapter 9, "Someone Else Sets the Price." Names are the book's pseudonyms. This deal was a traditional search fund: investors paid the searcher's salary during the search and funded most of the purchase, and the searcher, Neil Barrett, signed no personal guarantee because his wife had made that a condition before he started. A self-funded buyer in the same deal would have signed one.
Neil, a Navy veteran with an MBA, and his partner Chris bought a home-infusion pharmacy in Georgia: a business that compounds IV drugs in a sterile room and ships them overnight to patients at home. Revenue was about $20 million. Stated profit was a little over $3 million. The price was six times that profit, financed with about $12 million of bank debt, a seller note and investor equity. They had asked the bank for the most it would lend. Debt service ran about $200,000 a month, payroll about $250,000 every two weeks.
Diligence ran six months and was real. It still missed three things:
- A departing salesman. The company's top salesman, carrying about $2 million of revenue, left during diligence. In Neil's careful words, it was not clearly disclosed.
- A patient count full of duplicates. With no patient ID numbers, the same patient appeared more than once. After a scrub, about 40 percent of the census was duplicates. A business presented as growing about 20 percent a year had been shrinking about 10 percent a year.
- Where the profit lived. Three quarters of revenue came from antibiotics that earned almost nothing. One specialty line, about $5 million of revenue, threw off about $2 million of profit. Its price came from a published list that the company did not control.
The staff called the first winter's cash drain normal: the owner, they said, "just put money in" this time of year. That was not a season. It was a business that consumed cash, and a seller who had been feeding it.
Neil and Chris fought back. By fall, profit was back to about $300,000 a month, the level in their plan. Then, in January, a price update cut the rate for that specialty category by 90 percent. Same patients, same nurses, same work. About $2 million of yearly profit was gone, against $12 million of debt. There was no one to negotiate with.
They built a new specialty line from nothing to about $7 million of revenue in eighteen months, but it kept only about 20 cents of margin per drug dollar. When the bank and investors approved about $2 million of rescue money, Neil reran the model first. A one percent slip in drug margin broke it, and margin erosion was constant in that market. He told his board the money would likely be gone within six months, and they wound the company down, moving every patient to a new pharmacy with medicine in hand.
The book's verdict: Neil survived every diligence miss. "He lost anyway, because someone else set his prices." His model broke at one percent. The strangers took ninety.
Steps
These are the checks that would have caught it. Do steps 1 to 3 before the LOI.
1. Split gross profit by price-setter
Build a table of every product or service line with its revenue, its gross profit, and who sets its price:
| Line | Revenue | Gross profit | % of total profit | Who sets the price | Can change without consent? |
|---|
Do it on profit, not revenue. Neil's specialty line was a quarter of revenue and most of the profit. Revenue concentration is RF-01 territory; profit concentration in a line priced by a third party is worse, because there is no customer to keep happy.
2. Interrogate every lever a stranger holds
For each line priced by someone else, find out in writing, from primary sources:
- Who sets the price: the payer, program, platform, franchisor or customer, by name.
- How it is set: a published schedule, a contract term, an annual update, an auction.
- How often and how far it has moved in the past. Pull the published history yourself, not the seller's summary.
- What notice the company gets and whether there is any appeal.
- What is pending: proposed rules, contract renewals, rate reviews.
If the seller cannot answer these questions about their own most profitable line, you have learned something about the seller.
3. Verify the operating data behind the revenue
- Ask how the system counts customers, patients or accounts, and whether each has a unique ID. If not, rebuild the count yourself from billing records and remove duplicates.
- Reconcile the count to revenue: active accounts times average billing should land near reported revenue.
- Read twelve to twenty-four months of bank statements for owner contributions. Money the owner put in to cover a seasonal hole is a cost of running the business, and you will be the one putting it in next year.
- Require disclosure of every departure of a key salesperson or manager between LOI and closing, and a bring-down in the purchase agreement: the seller restates at closing that nothing material has changed. This is RF-07, key-employee risk.
4. Stress the lever, then find your break point
Run your model with the top third-party-priced line cut by 10, 25, 50 and 90 percent. For each case, compute DSCR.
Illustrative arithmetic, not from the case: a business earns $1,000,000 of cash flow before debt and pays $600,000 a year in debt service, a DSCR of 1.67. If $400,000 of that cash flow comes from one line whose price a payer controls, a 50 percent cut removes $200,000 and DSCR falls to 1.33. A 90 percent cut removes $360,000 and DSCR falls to 1.07, below the 1.25x SBA floor for an Initial Acquisition under SOP 50 10 8.1 (Y25). These cuts are your stress test on a possible future, not the lender's test, which runs on historical earnings. Then find the exact cut at which DSCR hits 1.0 and the company stops covering its debt. That number is your margin of safety. Neil's was one percent.
5. Size the debt to the stressed case
Borrow against the earnings that survive a realistic move in the lever, not the earnings in the broker's memo. Under SBA SOP 50 10 8.1, effective October 1, 2026, total debt in a change of ownership, including seller debt that is not on full standby, is limited to the business valuation and must be supported by debt service coverage; the lender's minimum is a floor, not your target. Inside a 7(a) deal, seller earnouts are prohibited. The one contingent tool the SOP names is a buyer rebate from the seller based on business performance, and under the SOP any rebate must be applied to pay down the principal of the 7(a) loan. The SOP does not name a seller note whose payments adjust if the controlled price falls; if you want one, your lender decides whether it is allowed. Ask your attorney and lender before you build a structure around the specific lever.
6. Decide in advance when you stop
Write down, before closing, the price cut or margin level at which the business cannot carry its debt, and what you will do when it arrives. Neil's last decision, to refuse rescue money he believed would be lost, is the hardest one in this book. It is far easier to make if you wrote the rule while rested.
Deliverable
A one-page Price-Setter Map:
- The profit-by-price-setter table from step 1.
- For each third-party lever: who, how, history, notice, appeal, and what is pending.
- The stress table: DSCR at 10, 25, 50 and 90 percent cuts, and the break-even cut.
- Your debt sizing on the stressed case, and any buyer rebate terms tied to the lever, with your lender's written view.
If the most profitable line is priced by a stranger and your break point is a few percent, the deal needs far less debt, or you need to walk.
This lesson is education, not lending, legal or investment advice. Have your lender and a licensed attorney review any financing structure before you sign.