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Curriculum/Part II: Failure Literacy: The Case Record/Blindsided

Lesson 2.3.2

Buying the Weather

A moving franchise bought at the pandemic peak. Ask what weather produced the P&L you are paying for. Macro conditions swamp operating skill, and a multiple paid on an unusual year is a multiple paid twice.

Lesson 9 of 14 in this part · 9 minute read · Draft, under review

Short answer

How do I know if a business's earnings are inflated by a temporary boom?

Date the track record. Write down the market conditions behind each year of financials, then find what the business or its peers earned in normal conditions: five years of history, month-by-month leading indicators, franchise system data and public data on the demand driver. Rebuild earnings at that baseline with benchmark costs and run your debt service test on that number.

A profit and loss statement is a photograph of weather. It shows the sunshine or the storm on the day it was taken. It cannot tell you what season it was taken in, and it will not warn you when the season is about to change. This lesson is about the buyer who paid for a sunny photograph, and about the three questions that would have shown him the season.

The case is Devin Price's, from the Buyer Beware failure record. Nobody in it lied. The revenue was real, the margins were real, the sellers kept every promise. He bought a moving franchise at the peak of a once-in-a-generation moving boom, and the boom ended the month he closed.

Principle

Before you buy anyone's numbers, ask what weather produced them. If the whole track record sits inside a boom, you do not have a track record. You have a boom.

Two rules follow.

Macro swamps micro. Operating skill cannot outrun a repriced market. When the cycle moves the one number your model leans on (demand, a price, an interest rate), it does not matter how well you run the machine.

A multiple paid on an unusual year is a multiple paid twice. You pay a multiple of earnings, so every dollar of boom profit is priced several times over. Then, when earnings fall back to normal, you carry debt sized to the boom on earnings sized to the baseline. You paid once for profit that was never going to repeat, and you pay again every month on the loan.

The research points the same way. A study of 428,233 SBA 7(a) loans disbursed between 2000 and 2016 found that franchisee loans made one to two years before a recession were more likely to default than comparable loans to independent businesses (F13, 2020). Earlier work on 7(a) loans found that default risk rises as a loan seasons, peaks in its second year, and declines after that, and that it moves with economic conditions (F8, 2005). The first two years of your loan are the years it is most exposed, and those are exactly the years in which a cycle turning against you does the most damage.

Case

Devin Price was an engineer who spent fifteen years at one energy firm until a downturn cost him his job. With no paycheck coming for the first time in his life, he discovered buying a business, joined a paid mentorship group, and did the homework thoroughly. He had already been burned once by starting a franchise from scratch, so his rule was to buy something already alive, with a track record he could check.

His search ran eleven months. Savings drained. In the mentorship group, someone posted a new closing every week. "I just needed to get something done," he said later. "I had no income."

The business had sat in his maybe pile for months: a territory of a national moving and junk-removal franchise in Charlotte, North Carolina. It had opened right as the pandemic began, so all three years of its history sat inside the pandemic moving boom. The numbers were beautiful. About $1.5 million of revenue. Growth of about 30 percent a year in a system where 10 percent was normal. Margins around 38 percent in a system where 20 percent was normal. A price of about 1.9 times what the business paid its owners each year.

The structure was standard self-funded: 10 percent cash from Devin, 10 percent seller note, and about 80 percent from an SBA-guaranteed bank loan of roughly $1.1 million including working capital. He signed a personal guarantee.

His diligence was careful. A CPA reviewed the books, which ran through one outside firm checked by the franchisor. He hired a deal attorney. He called other owners in the system. The bank approved the loan. He stress-tested his model with thinner margins and added management pay the sellers never had to cover. His worst case was a 10 percent decline.

He saw both flags. He asked more than once why margins were nearly double the system norm, and accepted the answer: a frugal husband-and-wife team with no managers. He knew the 30 percent growth could not last. He assumed it would level off. Level off, not crash. The whole case lives in the gap between those two phrases.

The real answer to the margin question sat in one expense line. During the boom, a few dollars of online advertising produced a flood of leads. The 38 percent margin was not frugality. It was customers who arrived at almost no cost.

By the month he closed, mortgage rates had turned, and people stopped buying, selling and moving houses. On his first Monday, his lead dashboard showed the same week a year earlier running about a third higher. Within a month leads were down 30 to 40 percent, year over year, and they stayed down. Leads that had been nearly costless now had to be bought, in a crowded market. Revenue fell while acquisition cost rose. His first full year came in at about $1.1 million of revenue and roughly zero profit.

What followed was a slow leak rather than a crash: a three-month payment deferral; an adjacent territory bought for about $65,000 on a seller note that added ground but not demand; a merchant cash advance; a second advance; business credit cards no longer paid in full; a second, thinner deferral. When he asked about restructuring the loan, the answer was that the bank did not do that, and the next step would be liquidation. As of the book's writing he owed about $940,000 on the SBA loan, about $85,000 on cards, about $47,000 on a cash advance and about $25,000 on the seller note, against a business earning roughly nothing. He still owned it. It had not ended.

His careful model tested a 10 percent drop against a business whose real baseline was 30 to 40 percent lower. The model was careful about the wrong number.

Steps

Step 1: Date the track record

Write down the years in the financials you are being asked to pay for, and next to each, the conditions in the business's market that year: demand drivers, interest rates, input prices, any one-time event (a pandemic, a storm season, a regulation change, a stimulus program). If every year sits in unusual conditions, flag it now. Cyclical exposure is a recognized failure cause even in funded search: a 2026 IESE note groups sudden market shifts among the main reasons search fund acquisitions fail (L15). That is traditional-search evidence; your own exposure is sharper because you have less equity to absorb it.

Step 2: Find the pre-boom baseline

Look for what the business, or businesses like it, earned in normal weather:

  • The business's own history before the unusual period, if it has one. Ask for five years, not three.
  • Same-month comparisons of leading indicators (leads, quotes, bookings, backlog) for the last 24 to 36 months, month by month against the prior year. Devin's own dashboard held the answer.
  • For a franchise, the system's data. The Franchise Disclosure Document includes Item 19 (financial performance representations, if the franchisor makes any) and Item 20 (outlet openings, transfers and closures). Read both, and call owners of older locations.
  • Public data on the demand driver itself, such as home sales for a mover or housing starts for a trade contractor.

If no baseline exists, say so in writing. Then treat your worst case as unknown, not as 10 percent.

Step 3: Decompose every margin gap

When the target's margin is far above its peers, go line by line against the benchmark. A too-good margin is usually a normal margin with one bill temporarily missing. For Devin it was marketing. Rebuild the P&L at benchmark spend for every line that is below the norm, and use that rebuilt margin in your model. This is red flag RF-09 (revenue and margin erosion) in its earliest form.

Step 4: Re-underwrite at the baseline

Rebuild earnings at baseline revenue and benchmark costs. Then run your debt service test on that number, not the seller's.

Know what the SBA rule does and does not do for you. Under SOP 50 10 8.1, effective October 1, 2026 (Y25), an initial acquisition must show debt service coverage (cash flow divided by loan payments) of at least 1.25 to 1, measured on the last fiscal year or an average of the last two, on a historical or adjusted basis. Projections do not count for a change of ownership. That rule protects you from a seller's hockey-stick forecast. It does not protect you from a boom, because two boom years averaged together are still a boom. The lender's test can pass a deal that your own baseline test fails. Run yours.

Illustrative arithmetic: a business shows $500,000 of earnings before debt service in its last two years, and the loan is sized to $380,000 of annual payments, about 1.3 times coverage. The pre-boom baseline is $300,000. The lender sees about 1.3 times on history, above the 1.25 floor, and can approve it. At baseline, coverage is about 0.8 times. That figure is your test, not the lender's, and the shortfall comes out of your savings under the guarantee.

Step 5: Ask the snap-back question

What does the loan payment look like if the cycle returns to normal the month you close? If the answer is that you lose everything, you are not buying a business. You are betting that a once-in-a-generation wave holds still.

The Harvard case on MC Tool shows how fast it happens: two partners doubled sales in their first year, then lost orders when the Great Recession hit in the fall of 2008, because the core business was cyclical (N32). Good operating did not change the timing.

Step 6: Price, structure or walk

You have three honest options:

  1. Re-price to the baseline. Pay a multiple of normal-weather earnings, not boom earnings.
  2. Structure the gap. Seller earnouts are prohibited in 7(a) acquisitions under SOP 50 10 8.1. The one contingent tool the SOP names is a buyer rebate from the seller based on business performance, and any rebate must be applied to pay down the principal of the 7(a) loan. Otherwise, structure means paying less cash at closing and deferring more of the price into a seller note on terms your lender approves. Your attorney drafts it.
  3. Walk. If neither works, the deal does not work.

Step 7: Check the decision, not just the deal

Devin bought in month eleven, with no income, inside a group that celebrated every closing. Before you sign, apply the Walk-Away Doctrine's month-eleven protocol: buy at month eleven only what you would have bought at month one. If the deal had been in your maybe pile for months and nothing about it improved except your bank balance getting worse, stop. Lesson 2.4.2 covers why this check fails when you need it most.

Apply it to Coastal Comfort HVAC

The fictional Coastal Comfort case is weather in miniature. Revenue jumped about 25 percent in FY2025, driven by one large new-construction job, a 41-unit townhome project, and by homeowners replacing systems early ahead of an announced equipment price increase tied to the refrigerant transition. Neither repeats. The broker's memo claims $1,710,000 of adjusted earnings. The earnings bridge in lesson 6.6.1 arrives at recurring earnings of about $1,017,000, roughly 60 percent of the headline. The weather question is how you find that gap before the quality of earnings work begins.

Deliverable

A one-page Weather Report for the deal:

  • Each year of the track record with its market conditions, and a flag for any year inside unusual weather.
  • The pre-boom baseline and its source, or a written note that none exists.
  • A line-by-line margin bridge from the target to the benchmark.
  • Debt service coverage at the seller's earnings, at your rebuilt earnings, and at the baseline.
  • Your decision: re-price, structure, or walk, and the answer to the question Devin Price would ask: what did this business earn before the boom, and can my debt survive that number?

This lesson is education, not lending, investment or legal advice. Confirm current SBA requirements with your lender, and have an attorney draft any seller note or rebate terms.

Common questions

Asked about this lesson

What is the SBA debt service coverage requirement for buying a business?

Under SBA SOP 50 10 8.1, effective October 1, 2026, an initial acquisition must show debt service coverage of at least 1.25 to 1, measured on the last fiscal year or an average of the last two, on a historical or adjusted basis. Projections do not count for a change of ownership. Two boom years averaged together are still a boom, so run your own baseline test.

Why would a business's profit margin be far above the industry norm?

A too-good margin is usually a normal margin with one bill temporarily missing. Go line by line against the benchmark, rebuild the profit and loss statement at benchmark spend for every line below the norm, and use that rebuilt margin in your model. In the lesson's case the missing bill was marketing during a boom.

When are SBA 7(a) loans most likely to default?

Research on 7(a) loans found that default risk rises as a loan seasons, peaks in its second year and declines after that, and that it moves with economic conditions. A study of 428,233 SBA 7(a) loans disbursed between 2000 and 2016 found franchisee loans made one to two years before a recession were more likely to default than comparable loans to independent businesses.

What should I read in the Franchise Disclosure Document before buying a franchise resale?

Read Item 19, the financial performance representations if the franchisor makes any, and Item 20, which covers outlet openings, transfers and closures. Then call owners of older locations. Together they help you find what the system earns in normal conditions, not only during an unusual period.

More answers on the buyer FAQ.

Sources

From the Library

  1. F13

    Patel, P. C., & Pearce, J. A (2020). Franchisees and loan default on third-party guarantee loans: Evidence from the United States. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 44(5), 861-877.

  2. F8

    Glennon, D. C., & Nigro, P (2005). Measuring the default risk of small business loans: A survival analysis approach. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 37(5), 923-947.

  3. N32

    Ruback, Richard S., and Royce Yudkoff. (2018). MC Tool. Harvard Business School Case 213-013, July 2012, 7 pages.

  4. L15

    Jan Simon. (2026). Search Funds: What Does Not Seem to Work and What Can Be Done About It?. Part II: Customer Concentration, Market Disruption, and Government Involvement. IESE ST-681-E, 18 pp.

  5. Y25

    U.S. Small Business Administration (2026). SOP 50 10 8.1, Lender and Development Company Loan Programs, with Technical Policy Updates. Effective October 1, 2026.