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Library/Information asymmetry, pricing, valuation and deal process

C34near-FT50Paywalled or restricted

Earnouts in mergers: Agreeing to disagree and agreeing to stay

Kohers, N., & Ang, J (2000)

Journal of Business, 73(3), 445-476

Examines a large sample of mergers with earnout payments. Earnouts work both as protection against misvaluing targets with high information asymmetry and as retention bonuses for target management. Bidder announcement returns are positive and are not reversed over three years.

Source (paywalled)doi:10.1086/209649197 citations (OpenAlex)

Full citation

Kohers, N., & Ang, J. (2000). Earnouts in mergers: Agreeing to disagree and agreeing to stay. Journal of Business, 73(3), 445-476.

https://doi.org/10.1086/209649

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