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Library/Succession, ownership transfer and family business

B5FT50

Inherited control and firm performance

Pérez-González, F. (2006)

American Economic Review, 96(5), 1559-1588

CEO successions (the sample is US listed corporations; that detail is from the paper as generally described, not from the abstract): firms that appoint family-related CEOs underperform on operating profitability and market-to-book relative to firms promoting unrelated CEOs, especially where the heir did not attend a selective college. Large-firm evidence; cited as the nepotism benchmark.

Sourcedoi:10.1257/aer.96.5.15591142 citations (OpenAlex)

Full citation

Pérez-González, F. (2006). Inherited control and firm performance. American Economic Review, 96(5), 1559-1588.

https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.5.1559

This page describes a work published elsewhere. The summary, where present, states what the authors claim; it is not the school's position. Read the source before quoting a figure.